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1. Introduction 
 
The gender division of labour, in which men tend to specialise more in paid work within the 
market, and women tend to specialise more in unpaid work within the home, is a feature 
common to modern Western society. Economic theory suggests that the price an individual 
can command in the labour market for an hour of their time plays a key role in determining 
the way in which they allocate their time between different uses. This is the case in models of 
individual  utility  maximization,  in  which  the  wage  determines  the  optimal  degree  of 
substitution between purchased goods and services and domestically-produced output, and 
also in models that emphasise the gains to intra-household specialization and trade. However, 
it is not clear to what extent in practice gender wage differences explain the observed gender 
division of labour. The importance of social norms regarding gender stereotypes and innate 
biological differences in the capabilities of men and women may swamp the role of gender 
wage differences in the allocation of time.  
 
The question of the role of wage rates is important because it gives an indication of how far 
trends towards gender equality in educational attainment (i.e. in market human capital) and in 
labour market opportunities (i.e. in the returns to that human capital) will result in a more 
equal division of labour. There are numerous reasons why female specialisation in unpaid 
domestic  work  may  be  the  subject  of  concern  in  a  gender  equity  sense.  For  example, 
domestic human capital may be of little value relative to market human capital outside a 
specific relationship, and so lead to less bargaining power within the relationship (via a lower 
external threat point) and poorer outcomes in the event of relationship breakdown. 
 
This paper uses data from the UK 2000 Time Use Survey to explore the relationship between 
wage rates and the intra-household allocation of time in a matched sample of spouses. A key 
feature of the dataset is that both spouses in a household simultaneously completed time 
diaries, and hence the data are not subject to problems of retrospective recall or error in the 
reporting of one’s spouse’s time allocation. The study analyses gender differences in paid and 
unpaid work alongside one another, as both theory and intuition suggest that an individual’s 
time allocation decisions are determined simultaneously. This contrasts with much work in 
the area, which tends to focus on gender gaps in one or other type of work in isolation.   3 
 
Maximum likelihood estimation is used to produce estimated labour supply functions for 
husbands and wives, for time in both paid and unpaid work. These labour supply functions 
estimate coefficients on an individual’s own wage (which captures the relative gain to an 
hour’s market work versus an hour spent in non-market activities) and on their wage relative 
to  their  spouse  (which  captures  incentives  for  intra-household  specialisation  and/or 
bargaining  power).  These  estimates  then  form  the  basis  for  a  Oaxaca-Blinder  type 
decomposition of the mean gender differences in weekly hours in paid and unpaid work, 
which allow us to draw some conclusions as to the importance of gender wage differences for 
the division of labour in the UK. 
 
The estimation procedure is designed to account for a number of econometric issues in the 
specification of household labour supply functions. Firstly, the decisions of individuals who 
do  not  participate  in  the  labour  market,  and  hence  record  zero  hours  of  paid  work,  are 
accounted  for  via  a  tobit  specification.  Secondly,  the  procedure  allows  for  the  fact  that 
unobservable factors are likely to lead to decisions on time allocation that are correlated 
within a household, both for a given individual and between spouses, and produces estimates 
of these correlations. Thirdly, the problem of missing wages for non-participants is tackled by 
using predicted wages. The coefficients for these predicting wage equations are estimated on 
a much larger dataset, but one that is drawn from the same underlying population as the time 
use sample, and hence are determined much more precisely than the time use sample would 
allow. Finally, the endogeneity of observed wages is accounted for by estimating a predicted 
gross full-time hourly wage for all the individuals in the sample. This corrects for the fact that 
observed net wages will be correlated with labour supply, both because of the non-linear 
nature of the tax system, and because many women with domestic responsibilities trade off 
lower  wages  in  exchange  for  the  flexibility  of  part-time  hours.  Our  methodology  also 
accounts for sample selection bias in the prediction of wage rates of non-full-time workers. 
 
To briefly preview our results, we find evidence of substantial gender-specific effects in the 
allocation  of  time,  but  more  so  to  domestic  work  than  to  market  work.  Higher-wage 
individuals spend more time in market work at the expense of both domestic production and 
leisure. This suggests that trends towards the equalization of male and female wages will   4 
result  in  some  decrease  in  gender  specialization,  but  also  a  reduction  in  average  female 
leisure times. In households with children, greater equality of wages between husbands and 
wives  is  associated  with  an  increase  in  female  market  work  and  a  reduction  in  female 
domestic work, but we find no evidence that men’s time is divided more equally between the 
two  sectors  when  wage  rates  are  more  equal.  This  implies  that  reductions  in  gender 
specialization come about largely because wife’s earnings are used to purchase substitutes for 
wife’s domestic production, rather than because husbands assume greater responsibility for 
domestic work. Gender-specific behaviours surrounding children account for a large fraction 
of the gender division of labour, but we find evidence of substantial gender effects that apply 
equally to all men and women regardless of fertility. 
 
Section 2 provides background on the gender division of labour, both in an international 
context  and  within  the  UK,  an  outline  of  theoretical  models  that  seek  to  explain  gender 
differences in time use, and a brief survey of previous findings on the role of gender wage 
differences.  Section  3  provides  details  of  the  datasets  used  in  the  analysis  and  the 
methodology used to predict wages. Section 4 outlines the methodologies used to decompose 
average gender differences in work times and to estimate the underlying parameters of the 
household labour supply functions. Section 5 gives our results, analysis of the sensitivity of 
our findings to different methodological assumptions, and sub-group analyses for households 
with  and  without  children  and  for  the  sub-sample  of  two-earner  couples.  Section  6 
summarises our findings and draws some conclusions. 
 
   5 
2. Background 
 
2.1 The gender division of labour in an international context 
The tendency for men and women to specialise respectively in market and domestic work is a 
common feature of developed countries. Research into the determinants of the market and 
domestic labour supplies of individuals tends to focus on one type of work in isolation
1. The 
nature of these research agendas obscures the fact that gender inequalities in total work times 
are  far  less  marked  than  gender  inequalities  in  labour  supplied  to  each  sector.  The  real 
differences  in  men’s  and  women’s  experiences  of  work  over  a  lifetime  come  not  from 
decisions about how much to work in total (and hence how much leisure to enjoy), but from 
decisions about how to divide total labour supply between the market and domestic sectors. 
 
To illustrate this, Figure 1 shows data on the gender differences in the mean weekly hours 
supplied to each sector for a sample of 12 developed countries. We define the ‘market work 
gap’ as the mean difference between men’s and women’s weekly market hours, and similarly 
the ‘domestic work gap’ as the mean difference between women’s and men’s weekly hours of 
domestic work
2. The countries in Figure 1 are arranged from those in which men’s total work 
time exceeds women’s on the left, to those in which women work longer hours in total on the 
right (the magnitude of the gap in total work times is given by the difference between the 
black and white bars). Time use data are not fully comparable across countries and relate to 
populations  of  slightly  different  ages,  so  caution  is  needed  in  drawing  conclusions  from 
Figure 1. However, it is clear that substantial gender specialisation exists across the US, 
Western and Eastern Europe and Australia. And, with the exception of the Eastern European 
countries on the right of Figure 1, it is noticeable that the sizes of the market and domestic 
work gaps are far larger than the differences between them. 
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the economic literature on paid labour supply (e.g. Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999) and the 
sociological literature on the division of domestic labour (e.g. Shelton and John, 1996). 
2 Other measures of the degree of specialisation are possible, for example, the share of total hours supplied to 
each sector by men, or the ratio of male to female labour supply in each sector. As Bianchi et al. (2000) argue, 
the  interpretation  of  changes  in  these  kinds  of  ratio  variable  can  be  confused,  as  changes  may  affect  the 
numerator, the denominator or both. We adopt the definition of the domestic work gap used by Bianchi et al., 
and define the market work gap analogously.    6 
Also shown in Figure 1 is the gender pay gap (the ratio of average female gross earnings per 
hour to average male earnings per hour) for a sub-sample of countries. Not much can be 
inferred on the basis of such a small sample, plus the pay gap is likely to be endogenous with 
respect to time allocation decisions, but it is clear that gender differences in time use sit 
alongside substantial differences in wages. The question addressed in this paper is the extent 
to which these differences in labour market opportunities in the UK can account  for the 
observed gender division of labour. 
 
2.2 The gender division of labour in the UK 
The implications of the sexual division of labour for the experiences of men and women in 
the  UK  manifest  themselves  along  a  wide  range  of  dimensions.  In  terms  of  market 
production,  women  aged  16-64  are  nearly  twice  as  likely  to  be  classed  as  economically 
inactive as men in the same age group. Even where women do work in the market, they 
contribute far fewer hours to paid work – female workers are four times as likely to work 
part-time as male workers
3. With regard to non-market production, women without children 
contribute  70  percent  more  hours  per  week  to  domestic  production  than  men,  whilst  the 
figure for women with children under 16 is more than double that of men
4. Of children living 
with a single parent, over 90 percent live with the mother
5.  
 
The  assumption  of  differing  responsibilities  according  to  gender  has  implications  for  the 
levels of human capital individuals choose to acquire and the occupations they choose to 
pursue. To the extent that the returns to education and experience in the labour market are 
larger the more hours an individual works, women who anticipate specialising in domestic 
production have less incentive to accumulate such human capital. For example, among the 
working age population in the UK, 56 percent of men have the equivalent of an A-level or 
higher, compared with 43 percent of women
6.  Investments in non-market rather than market 
human capital will tend to predict the occupations chosen by women when they do choose to 
participate  in  the  labour  market.  Women  tend  to  cluster  in  occupations  where  the  skills 
required are complementary to those required in domestic production, such as the provision 
                                                 
3 EOC (2005a) 
4 EOC (2005b) 
5 ONS (2005) 
6 ONS (2003)   7 
of emotional and caring services and household management. Women account for over 80 
percent of workers in personal services and administrative and secretarial occupations, and 
for a similar proportion of those employed in the health, social work and education sectors
7. 
 
All of these factors contribute to a substantial gender gap in pay. Olsen and Walby (2004) 
report a gender gap in average hourly earnings of 18% for those working full-time in 2003, 
and  a  huge  40%  for  those  working  part-time.  They  attribute  over  a  third  of  the  gender 
differential in pay to differences in life-time working patterns – the fact that women tend to 
have spent longer out of the labour force engaged in family care than men, and the fact that 
when they do work, they often work part- rather than full-time. Around a fifth of the pay gap 
is attributable to labour market factors such as the concentration of women in low-paying 
occupations  and  the  fact  that  women  are  less  likely  to  work  in  larger,  unionised 
establishments. Differences in education between men and women account for less than 10% 
of the pay gap, leaving 38% that they attribute to discrimination (whether direct or indirect), 
systematic disadvantage and gender-specific preferences or motivations. 
 
There is evidence, however, that long-term social trends may be leading to an erosion of the 
gender pay differential. The gender pay gap for full-time work has fallen from 29 percent in 
1973 to around 17 percent in 2005 and female labour force participation rates have risen by 
around 10 percentage points over the same period. Rising divorce rates, increases in the age 
at first marriage and falling fertility have all increased the number of years that women can 
expect  to  spend  as  economically  independent,  i.e.  without  a  spouse,  and  without 
responsibility for dependent children. Average age at marriage has increased by around 6 
years for both men and women since 1975, the average age of mothers by 3 years and the 
total fertility rate has fallen from 2.37 in 1971 to 1.78 in 2004. Trends in the attainment of 
educational qualifications also point towards a reduction in the gender pay gap. In 1970/1 58 
percent of students in further education and 67 percent of students in higher education were 
male.  By  the  year  2000  these  proportions  had  reversed,  such  that  59  and  57  percent  of 
students respectively were female
8. The analysis in this paper provides some indication of 
how we might expect rising female wages to impact on the gender division of labour. Of 
                                                 
7 EOC (2005a) 
8 EOC (2005c)   8 
course, long-term demographic trends may lead to changing social norms and have further 
consequences for the working patterns of men and women, but such analysis is beyond the 
scope of what is feasible using a cross-sectional time use dataset.  
 
2.3 Welfare consequences of female specialisation in domestic work 
When thinking in terms of individual welfare, the presumption is often that women whose 
main role is as a carer have access to a male partner’s income. Yet there is much evidence 
that  female  specialisation  in  domestic  work  disadvantages  women  across  a  number  of 
dimensions. Women are 14% more likely than men to live in households with equivalised 
incomes  below  the  poverty  line  (calculated  at  60%  of  median  income).  Female-headed 
households – lone parents and retired women living alone in particular – are especially at 
risk. There is evidence that women face substantial drops in income following separation or 
divorce, whereas men can expect to experience small increases in income
9. Pensions which 
assume  contributions  over  a  full-time  continuous  working  lifetime  of  40  or  more  years 
discriminate implicitly against women and it is estimated that only 49 per cent of women 
pensioners receive the full Basic State Pension, compared with 92 per cent of men
10. There is 
also evidence that women who don’t participate in the labour market are at a higher risk of 
experiencing  domestic  violence,
11 perhaps  because  exit  from  an  abusive  relationship  is 
hindered by economic dependence.  
 
Finally, both theory and evidence from the intra-household bargaining literature suggest that 
specialisation in the domestic sector may have implications for an individual’s well-being 
within a marriage, as well as in the event of relationship breakdown.  As Brines (1994) notes, 
we can think of the household in which spouses specialise and trade with one another as a 
situation of bilateral monopoly. But as Brines goes on to point out, there is a fundamental 
asymmetry in the nature of what each partner has to trade: “Housework – unpaid labour 
performed  within  the  household  –  is  by  definition  without  exchange  value  in  the  classic 
sense;  that  is,  it  is  nonportable  or  illiquid  as  a  form  of  currency  beyond  the  specific 
relationship, unlike what the main breadwinner brings to the trade” (pp. 656). It follows that 
                                                 
9 Brockel  (2005)  
10 EOC (2003) 
11 Mirlees-Black (1999)   9 
an individual who has acquired relationship-specific domestic human capital will have lower 
expected utility in the event of divorce than the partner who specialises in market work, both 
because they can expect lower earnings in the event that they must be self-supporting, and 
because of their lower desirability to potential re-marriage partners. The bargaining literature 
then suggests that the spouse with the stronger ‘outside option’ will have more influence over 
the allocation of resources in the household, for example by wielding the ‘threat’ of divorce 
over the partner with the weaker outside option (see Lundberg and Pollak, 1996, for a review 
of the literature). Folbre (2001) suggests a further reason why specialisation in the domestic 
sector may weaken an individual’s bargaining power. For individuals who are engaged in 
caring labour, such as caring for children, threats to withhold their labour as an exercise of 
bargaining power may not be credible – the individual may become a ‘prisoner of love’ in the 
sense that their unwillingness to neglect the children allows exploitation by their spouse. 
 
One empirical strand of the literature explores the extent to which the income controlled by 
the husband and wife impacts on family behaviour. Examples of the findings of this literature 
are that increases in the wife’s income relative to the husband’s income are associated with 
increases in expenditure on restaurant meals, childcare and women’s clothing and reduced 
expenditure on alcohol  and tobacco (e.g.  Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997, Phipps and 
Burton, 1992). Increases in child health, nutrition and survival probabilities have also been 
linked with mothers’ control over resources (e.g. Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995). This suggests 
firstly that men and women have systematically differing preferences over the way in which 
household income should be allocated, and secondly that an individual’s income contribution 
to  the  household  plays  a  role  in  family  bargaining,  over  and  above  its  implications  for 
external threat points. As Pollak (2005) suggests, spouses may maintain ‘mental accounts’ 
that relate each spouse’s consumption to the income they contribute, which may then be 
reinforced by money management practices such as separate bank accounts. 
 
2.4 The role of wages in the gender division of labour 
It is clear that past decisions regarding labour supply and occupational choice will play an 
important  role  in  gender  wage  differences  that  are  observed  in  cross-sectional  data  on 
spouses. Wages are not assigned exogenously to individuals and it is not our aim in this paper 
to assess whether observed gender wage differences lead causally to the observed division of   10 
labour.  Such an investigation would require some exogenous variation in wages, or data with 
a panel aspect that could be used to relate changes in wages to changes in time allocation. 
Rather, our question is whether, given the earnings capacities of the two spouses in the labour 
market, individuals do in fact allocate time in the way economic theory would predict. If the 
allocation of time does appear sensitive to spousal wage differences then it is at least possible 
that changes in the gender distribution of wages would be accompanied by changes in the 
division of labour. If, however, other factors such as biological differences and social norms 
are relatively more important, then it is unlikely that the equalisation of pay between men and 
women would lead to a substantial erosion of gender specialisation. 
 
Becker’s (1991) pioneering work on the economics of the family suggests two reasons why 
gender wage differences between spouses might be associated with a traditional division of 
labour. The first relates the case where individuals act as autonomous, egoistic individuals 
and allocate time in order to maximise own (selfish) utility. Chapter 1 of ‘A Treatise on the 
Family’ outlines such a model and shows that when an individual participates in the labour 
market,  the  marginal  utility  of  time  from  all  uses  must  be  equal  to  the  wage  rate  in 
equilibrium. The wage effectively represents the ‘price’ of time spent in non-market uses in 
terms of foregone consumption. Increases in the wage will have an income and a substitution 
effect. The income effect reduces time spent in market work by raising the demand for non-
market time, whilst the substitution effect increases time in market work because non-market 
time  becomes  relatively  more  expensive.  Provided  that  the  substitution  effect  dominates, 
higher-wage individuals will devote more time to market work than lower-wage individuals 
and hence spend less time in non-market uses, including domestic production. In practical 
terms, the individual utility function model captures the notion that, at higher wage rates, 
individuals may find it optimal to purchase market substitutes for domestic output (such as 
childcare or restaurant meals) with the earnings generated by additional market work. At 
lower wage rates the real price of such goods and services is higher and it is more cost 
effective to produce within the home. 
 
It is possible that the earnings an individual could generate from even one hour of market 
work are insufficient to compensate for the accompanying reduction in non-market time. In 
this case the shadow price of time (or reservation wage) will exceed the available market   11 
wage and the individual will not participate in the labour market at all. The substitution effect 
associated with higher wages provides one rationale for why men might devote more time to 
the market than women, and correspondingly less time to domestic production. However, if 
women are innately more productive than men in domestic work, or if they systematically 
prefer domestically-produced output to purchased goods and services, we would not expect 
men and women with a given wage rate to allocate time in the same way.   
 
The second way in which the gender differential in spouses’ wage rates might generate a 
division of labour is outlined in Chapter 2 of ‘A Treatise on the Family’. Becker’s key insight 
is that there are potential gains to intra-household specialisation and trade. If spouses differ in 
their relative market and domestic productivities, then household output will be maximised if 
individuals allocate time to the sector in which they are relatively most productive and trade 
surplus output with their spouse. Becker makes the analogy with a system of international 
trade, in which countries specialise on the basis of their comparative advantage. In terms of 
intra-household specialisation, an individual has a comparative advantage in market work if 
their relative wage (the ratio of their own to their spouse’s wage) is greater than their relative 
domestic  productivity  (again,  the  ratio  of  own  to  spouse’s  productivity).  The  greater  the 
differential in the spouses’ relative productivities, the larger are the potential gains to the 
household of a division of labour. If men and women do not differ in domestic productivity 
then higher male wages will automatically lead to a male comparative advantage in market 
work. It is also the case under this assumption, however, that couples in which the wife has 
the higher earnings capacity should exhibit a non-traditional division of labour in which the 
wife specialises in the market and the husband in the domestic sector. Becker’s theory is 
essentially gender-neutral and places key emphasis on the assumption of rational optimising 
behaviour on the part of individuals. The assumption that outcomes are efficient requires that 
spouses  exploit  any  potential  gains  from  intra-household  trade.  In  Becker’s  model  this 
follows axiomatically from the specification of a single household utility function (the so-
called  unitary  assumption),  a  specification  that  has  been  much  criticised  for  ignoring 
conflicting  preferences  between  the  individual  members  of  the  household.  Browning  and 
Chiappori (1998) argue that even when the unitary assumption is dropped, the household can 
be characterised as a repeated ‘game’ in which the preferences of the participants are known   12 
to one another. These features, they argue, make it plausible that household members find 
mechanisms to support efficient outcomes. 
 
The preceding discussion showed that under the assumption of equal domestic productivities, 
the higher-earning spouse has an incentive to specialise in market work.  Becker provides two 
reasons,  however,  why  it  is  likely  that  there  will  be  systematic  differences  in  domestic 
productivity between spouses. Firstly, he assumes that individuals have the opportunity to 
invest in different types of human capital that raise productivity differentially in the market 
and domestic sectors. If this is the case then the gains to a division of labour are raised if each 
spouse specialises in the type of human capital they choose to accumulate as well as in the 
allocation of time. This assumption implies that the unobserved characteristics of individuals 
will tend to exaggerate differences in time allocation that are associated with a given wage 
differential. Over time, specialisation in the domestic sector will lead to the acquisition of 
skills that reduce the degree of substitutability between spouses’ time inputs into domestic 
work. At the same time, lack of on-the-job market human capital investment will reduce the 
potential market wage of the spouse specialising in domestic work. In terms of our analysis, 
the mechanism of specialised human capital investments implies that we should find a strong 
association between the spousal wage differential and the degree of specialisation within the 
household. Note, however, the assumption that domestic productivity depends strongly on 
human capital is essentially an assertion. In a technologically advanced society, it is possible 
that the bulk of domestic tasks are routine in nature and do not require high degrees of skill. 
 
The second reason for supposing that domestic productivity differs systematically between 
spouses relates to the assumed biological superiority of females in domestic production. The 
role of women in childbirth and breastfeeding provides an unarguable example of tasks in 
which men’s inputs into domestic production cannot substitute for women’s inputs. Becker 
argues that complementarities exist between the bearing and rearing of children, for example 
because “a mother can more readily feed and watch her older children while she produces 
additional children than while she engages in most other activities” (pp. 38). If biology is an 
important factor in determining an individual’s domestic productivity, then women may have 
a comparative advantage in domestic work that swamps the role of gender differences in 
wage  rates.  We  would  then  expect  to  find  little  association  between  the  spousal  wage   13 
differential  and  the  allocation  of  time,  because  women’s  time  is  always  relatively  more 
productive than men’s in the domestic sector. 
 
Even when we allow for the role of biological differences between men and women, Becker’s 
model is essentially gender-neutral in that it characterises individuals solely in terms of their 
relative  market  and  domestic  productivities.  The  requirement  that  individuals  allocate 
resources rationally in order to produce efficient outcomes implies that the spouse with a 
comparative advantage in market work must specialise in the market sector, regardless of 
their  gender.  A  critique  of  this  gender-neutrality  approach  has  arisen  in  the  sociological 
literature on the division of housework between spouses. Bianchi et al. (2000) and Brines 
(1994) provide good summaries of the literature on this gender perspective. The argument is 
that the performance of certain tasks provides a way for individuals to enact their gender 
identity and fulfil the socially determined roles of wife and mother, or husband and father. 
Women enact their femininity by being economically dependent on a husband, performing 
housework and maintaining the standard of the home environment, whereas men enact their 
masculinity by being the main breadwinner and avoiding the performance of ‘women’s work’ 
within  the  home.  Socialisation  from  early  childhood  onwards  and  occupational,  legal, 
political and policy structures shape both the preferences of, and opportunities available to, 
men and women in systematically different ways. In terms of a neoclassical model of utility 
maximisation,  this  can  perhaps  best  be  characterised  by  the  assumption  that  the  relative 
disutilities of time spent in market and domestic work differ substantially between men and 
women. In households in which the wife has a comparative advantage in market work, a non-
traditional  division  of  labour  would  be  associated  with  a  reduction  in  the  utilities  of  the 
members of the household that could outweigh the gain in output resulting from an efficient 
allocation of time. In terms of our analysis, the greater the importance of the enactment of 
gender roles, the smaller the association we would expect to find between spouses’ wage 
rates and the allocation of time. 
 
2.5 Previous findings 
As we have noted, much of existing literature on gender differences in work patterns focuses 
exclusively on either market work or domestic work in isolation. In addition, research on the   14 
determinants of domestic work is carried out mainly within the disciplines of sociology and 
demography, whilst economists have studied the factors underlying market labour supply. 
 
2.5.1 Domestic labour supply 
A large body of empirical sociological literature has arisen on the division of housework 
between spouses. It is difficult, however, to disentangle the role played by gender differences 
in wage rates because the most commonly adopted specifications include control variables 
that  confuse  interpretation.  Specifically,  many  authors  have  investigated  the  relationship 
between the share of household income contributed by each spouse and the amount of time 
each spends in housework. This variable conflates gender differences in an outcome of the 
intra-household  allocation  process  –  market  labour  supply  –  with  gender  differences  in 
earnings capacities. The implicit assumption of many authors is that market work hours are 
determined exogenously with regard to domestic work hours. Indeed, this assumption appears 
to  underlie  the  entire  ‘time  availability  perspective’  in  the  sociological  literature,  which 
models domestic work as a function of the time remaining to an individual after market work 
and study commitments are taken into consideration
12.  
 
Bianchi  et  al.  (2000)  and  Hersch  and  Stratton  (1994)  both  find  that  the  wife’s  share  of 
household  income  is  negatively  associated  with  wife’s  housework  hours  and  positively 
associated with husband’s hours. To see the problem of interpretation of this finding, note 
that even if the allocation of time to market work were entirely unrelated to the relative 
productivities of the spouses, this pattern would emerge if spouses who work longer in the 
market, and hence generate more income, also tend to work less in the domestic sector. The 
fact that the income share variables are significant even when controls for husbands’ and 
wives’ hours of market work are included does suggest that gender wage differences play 
some  role  in  the  allocation  of  time.  But  holding  market  hours  constant  removes  the 
mechanism by which higher wages lead to a shift in time allocation from the domestic to the 
market sector. Rather, the interpretation of the income share variable must reflect only the 
partial  impact  of  the  gender  wage  differential  on  domestic  work  via  its  influence  on 
                                                 
12 See Shelton and John (1996) for a review of the sociological literature on domestic labour supply that outlines 
the time availability perspective.   15 
bargaining  power  or  differential  spending  on  consumption  goods  versus  substitutes  for 
domestic output.  
 
Brines  (1994)  finds  that  wives’  housework  hours  fall  as  their  relative  contribution  to 
household income rises, whilst the relationship between husbands’ hours and their relative 
income contribution exhibits an inverse U-shape – households in which income is produced 
equally by the husband and the wife see greater male housework hours than households in 
which either the husband or the wife is the main breadwinner. The finding that men do less 
housework when the wife is the main breadwinner relates particularly to men in low-income 
households and the long-term unemployed. Brines interprets the finding as evidence of the 
‘gender display’ perspective in which men who are economically dependent on their wives 
maintain their masculinity by resisting participation in the ‘women’s work’ of housework. 
This study is subject to the problems of interpretation highlighted above, but we note that the 
finding  that  both  spouses’  housework  time  is  reduced  when  the  female  is  the  main 
breadwinner is equally consistent with a model in which male and female earnings are spent 
differentially  on  substitutes  for  domestic  production.  Bittman  et  al.  (2003)  report  similar 
findings to Brines in a specification that controls for market work hours. 
 
Alvarez and Miles (2003) analyse data on the housework of a sample of Spanish two-earner 
couples and, in a similar spirit to this paper, perform a Oaxaca-Blinder-type decomposition of 
the  gender  difference  in  housework  hours.  Again,  they  use  a  spouse’s  contribution  to 
household income as an explanatory variable and find that increases in the wife’s share are 
associated with reductions in the wife’s housework hours but with no significant changes in 
the husband’s housework time. The results of their decomposition suggest that differences in 
the observable characteristics of spouses account for only a small fraction of the gender gap 
in housework times – gender-specific effects are overwhelmingly responsible for the unequal 
division of domestic labour.  
 
2.5.2 Market labour supply 
The empirical economics literature on family labour supply has not typically addressed the 
question of why males supply more market labour than females directly. Instead, empirical 
work has focussed on the testing of restrictions implied by theoretical models of individual   16 
and collective rationality or, alternatively, the estimation of labour supply elasticities that can 
be used to assess the impact of tax and welfare policies. However, the results presented in 
many of these studies do provide evidence on the sensitivity of men’s and women’s labour 
supplies to own  and spouse’s wages.  Evers et  al. (2006) provide a meta-analysis of 239 
estimates  of  the  uncompensated  wage  elasticity  of  labour  supply.  They  report  a  mean 
elasticity for men of 0.07 and for women of 0.41. There is much less variation in estimates of 
the elasticity for men than for women, and the median values are more similar at 0.08 and 
0.28  respectively.  Their  findings  do  suggest,  however,  that  market  labour  supply  is 
responsive to the wage for both sexes, and more so for women than for men.  
 
Studies that analyse the labour supply of married couples also provide evidence on intra-
household influences on labour supply. Lundberg (1988) finds that, amongst couples without 
young children, neither the husband’s nor the wife’s labour supply is sensitive to the earnings 
or the market hours of the spouse. Lundberg characterises this finding as consistent with the 
complete  independence  of  labour  supply  decisions,  conditional  on  the  composition  and 
permanent  characteristics  of  the  household.  Where  young  children  are  present,  however, 
Lundberg  finds  evidence  of  labour  supply  interactions.  Higher  husband’s  earnings  are 
associated with lower wife’s market hours, although the reverse it not true for higher wife’s 
earnings  and  husband’s  market  hours.  Fortin  and  Lacroix  (1997)  estimate  labour  market 
supply functions for two-earner households with at most one child.  They find positive and 
significant  own-wage  elasticities  but  cross-wage  elasticities  that  are  small,  imprecisely 
determined  and  rarely  reach  statistical  significance.  Devereux  (2004)  finds  evidence  of  a 
significant negative association between the husband’s wage and wife’s labour supply but, 
again,  no  evidence  of  a  symmetric  relationship  between  the  wife’s  wage  and  husband’s 
labour supply. 
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3. Data 
 
3.1 Time use data 
Data on the market and domestic labour supplies of married/cohabiting couples
13 are taken 
from  the  UK  2000  Time  Use  Survey  (UKTUS).  We  restrict  our  attention  to  traditional 
nuclear  families,  as  they  are  households  in  which  there  exist  potential  gains  to  a  gender 
division of labour. Social and biological norms regarding gender roles and the raising of 
children also focus strongly on the behaviour of heterosexual couples. To the extent that the 
majority  of  individuals  anticipate  forming  such  a  union  at  some  point  in  their  lives,  the 
behaviour  of  married  couples  provides  a  focal  point  that  will  influence  human  capital 
decisions and notions of what makes a ‘desirable’ marriage partner. We exclude households 
with any additional persons aged 16 or over in order to focus the analysis on the division of 
labour between two individuals of different sexes. 
 
The  UKTUS  is  a  national  household-based  survey  with  questionnaire  and  time  diary 
components. Each household member was asked to complete two 24-hour time diaries – one 
on  a  weekday  and  one  on  a  Saturday  or  Sunday  –  identifying  his  or  her  primary  and 
secondary  time  uses  for  each  10-minute  interval.  The  data  contain  information  on  6414 
households in total although our working sample is restricted to couples in 1170 households. 
Appendix Table A1 details the sample selection criteria used to define the working sample.  
 
Comparisons  of  the  information  derived  from  time  diaries  and  that  derived  from  survey 
questionnaires  suggest  that  diary  data  is  substantially  more  reliable.  Juster  and  Stafford 
(1991) review evidence on this issue and argue that ‘retrospective recall’ methods result in 
systematic biases because many tasks are not memorable, not repetitive day by day and do 
not leave traces in terms of market measurements that may be used as a proxy. The major 
bias appear to be over-reporting, due to the fact that respondents recall a day on which the 
activity was particularly prominent and treat that as an average day. Attitudes and norms also 
influence the information provided in response to survey questions. Over-reporting is found 
                                                 
13 Throughout we use the term ‘married’ to refer to both married and cohabiting couples. Kalenkoski et al. 
(2005) analyse data on market labour supply and childcare from the UKTUS and find no significant differences 
in the behaviour of married and cohabiting couples.   18 
even for market labour supply, which is surprising, given the regularity of many people’s 
work  schedules.  In  contrast,  the  consecutive  structure  of  a  diary  minimises  the  reporting 
burden on respondents by allowing them to record time use in its naturally occurring order 
and forcing them to account for all 24 hours in the day. An important feature of the UKTUS 
is that husbands and wives are each responsible for completing their own individual time 
diaries. Discrepancies in the self-report and spousal-report of an individual’s time use may 
introduce biases into analysis that relies solely on information provided by one household 
member. For example, Alvarez and Miles (2003) find that wives are more likely to report that 
husbands’ hours of housework are zero than are husbands themselves. This is also the finding 
of  Kamo  (2000),  although  neither  study  finds  discrepancies  in  wives’  housework  hours 
depending on the identity of the respondent. In summary, the household-level structure and 
the time-diary element of the UKTUS enable us to avoid many of the reporting biases in 
hours  of  work  that  are  associated  with  questionnaire-based  surveys  such  as  the  British 
Household Panel Survey. 
 
For the purposes of this study, market work is defined to include on-the-job breaks, activities 
relating to employment and job-seeking, commuting time and travel in the course of work. 
Domestic work covers all activities classed as household and family care, plus associated 
travel time (such as travel related to shopping and escorting a child)
14. Primary time uses only 
are analysed in the main body of the paper, although the sensitivity of our results to the 
definitions of market and domestic work are explored in Section 5.4. Weekly hours of work 
are derived as the weighted sum of hours recorded in the weekday diary (with weight 5) and 
hours recorded in the weekend diary (with weight 2). 
 
3.2 Wage data and variable selection 
The aim of this paper is to explore the association between gender differences in wage rates 
and the gender division of labour. We argue that the appropriate wage to use in this case is 
the gross hourly wage rate that an individual could receive, were they to take a full-time job. 
The average net wage, usually computed as the ratio of usual weekly take-home pay to usual 
weekly hours of work, is inappropriate because it is determined jointly with market labour 
                                                 
14 Specifically, market work is the sum of activities coded 1, 911, 913 and 914 in the UKTUS. Domestic work is 
the sum of activities coded 3, 923, 931, 936, 937, 938, and 939.   19 
supply via the tax system. An individual who works only a few hours in the market will have 
a higher net wage per hour than an individual who works longer hours, even if both have the 
same gross wage, because of the non-linearity of marginal tax rates. The use of net wages 
would then tend to underestimate the true gender wage gap because men work longer hours 
than women and hence pay a greater fraction of their earnings in tax. 
 
Our interest in this paper lies in the extent to which spouses’ time allocation is influenced by 
the  absolute  and  relative  earnings  capacities  of  the  husband  and  wife.  The  theory  of 
comparative  advantage  suggests  that  it  is  an  individual’s  relative  abilities  in  generating 
market income and in producing domestic output that will determine the sector in which they 
specialise and the degree of specialisation. Once an efficient division of labour is determined, 
the observed wage of the individual who specialises in the domestic sector may diverge from 
the wage he or she could receive, were he or she to instead specialise in the market sector.  
Becker’s  (1985)  model  of  an  individual’s  optimal  allocation  of  energy  between  different 
activities provides a theoretical rationale for why women with domestic responsibilities will 
choose ‘segregated’ jobs and occupations, invest less in on-the-job human capital and earn 
less than individuals who do not shoulder the same domestic responsibilities. Hersch and 
Stratton (1997) estimate the direct effect of housework on wages using OLS, IV and fixed-
effect techniques and conclude that gender differences in domestic responsibilities explain a 
substantial fraction of the gender gap in observed wages. In the UK, the impact of domestic 
work on wages manifests itself in particular in the ‘part-time pay penalty’. Manning and 
Petrongolo (2005) provide evidence that around 45 percent of women in the UK in 2003 
worked part-time and, on average, earned 22 percent less than women who worked full-time. 
When they account for differences in the composition of the samples of part-time and full-
time women, they find a residual pay penalty to part-time work of between 3 and 10 percent, 
depending on whether one accounts for occupational differences between the two groups. 
There is evidence that we can think of this as a kind of compensating wage differential, in 
that women appear to be prepared to accept a lower wage in return for the greater flexibility 
afforded by a part-time job. Ninety percent of women working part-time (excluding full-time 
students) stated that they did not want a full-time job, with the vast majority citing domestic 
or family commitments as the primary reason. 
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The question we address in this paper is how far fundamental differences in the earnings 
capacities of spouses (which depend on levels of human capital and the return to that capital 
in the labour market) can account for the gender division of labour. In terms of our analysis, 
the existence of the part-time pay penalty introduces an endogeneity bias into estimates of the 
impact of the wage on time allocation. To see this, suppose that the full-time wage available 
to a wife is identical to that of her husband, but that she has an advantage in domestic work as 
a result of biological factors and social norms. She will specialise in the domestic sphere and 
may take a part-time job at a lower wage than would be available if she were instead to work 
full-time. A comparison of the observed wages of the husband and wife would suggest that 
she has assumed domestic responsibilities at least in part because her earnings capacity is 
lower, when in fact the causation runs in reverse from the division of labour to the wage. We 
tackle this problem by predicting an expected full-time wage for individuals who work part-
time  or  not  at  all  in  the  labour  market.  In  order  to  maintain  a  consistent  stochastic 
specification, we predict wages for the full sample of spouses, including those who do work 
full-time,  and  use  these  predicted  wages  as  the  explanatory  variables  in  our  analysis.  In 
effect, we make the identifying assumption that the wages of individuals working in full-time 
jobs represent their true underlying earnings capacity, and that the trade-off of lower wages 
for greater flexibility operates solely through the decision to take a part-time job.  
 
Because the number of full-time workers in our UKTUS working sample is relatively small – 
941 men and 421 women out of the 1170 households – we estimate the coefficients of the 
wage equations using the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). The larger sample sizes in 
the QLFS allow us to estimate the returns to various characteristics with much more precision 
than if we were to use the UKTUS sample
15. Both the QLFS and UKTUS are produced by 
the  Office  of  National  Statistics  and  use  sampling  procedures  designed  to  generate  a 
nationally-representative  random  sample.  A  number  of  questions  in  the  two  surveys  are 
phrased in identical ways and can be used to define a common set of explanatory variables. 
We take data for the months June 2000 to September 2001 inclusive to coincide with the 
survey  dates  of  the  UKTUS,  and  retain  only  observations  on  individuals  in 
married/cohabiting  couples  aged  between  18  and  retirement  age  and  not  in  full-time 
education for comparability. Use of the QLFS has the added advantage that it contains data 
                                                 
15 Sample sizes used from the QLFS are 15 669 full-time working women and 29 187 full-time working men.   21 
on gross hourly wages, whereas the UKTUS contains data only on average net wages, or 
more specifically on usual take-home pay after deductions and usual hours of work. This 
enables  us  to  predict  an  individual  gross  hourly  wage  without  the  need  for  complicated 
calculations of the tax deducted from pay at source.  
 
The simplest way to predict a full-time wage for the individuals in our sample is to run a 
Mincer-type  wage  equation  on  the  QLFS  sample  of  full-time  workers  (we  run  separate 
regressions  for  men  and  women)  and  then  apply  the  estimated  coefficients  to  the 
characteristics of the individuals in the UKTUS sample. Characteristics that are available in 
both datasets are: a detailed breakdown of highest educational qualifications into 40 discrete 
categories; age and age squared; ethnicity; month and year of survey; region of residence; 
number and age of children in the household; marital status; and 4 variables capturing health 
problems and the way in which they limit the individual’s activity
16. It is likely however, that 
such a method would over-estimate the potential wages of individuals who currently work 
either part-time or not at all in the labour market. This is partly because full-time workers are 
likely to have higher levels of market human capital resulting from more complete work 
histories and on-the-job experience (data on which are unavailable in the UKTUS) and partly 
because of self-selection into full-time work on the basis of unobservables.  Hence both the 
constant term and the estimated returns to observed characteristics in the wage equation are 
likely  to  be  biased  upwards,  relative  to  the  true  returns  a  part-time  or  non-worker  could 
expect to receive. 
 
The preferred specification used in this paper estimates separate wage equations for full-time 
workers and those who work part-time or not at all (and also for men and women)
17. Hence 
we use the information on an individual’s current labour market status to infer something 
about the unobservable components of market human capital. Full-time workers are predicted 
a wage from an equation run on the sample of full-time workers in the QLFS using the 
variables listed above. The predicted wage for full-time workers is hence 
                                                 
16 Information on an individual’s occupation and industry are available in both datasets. We do not use these 
variables in prediction, however, as there is evidence that individuals switch occupation and industry when 
moving between full- and part-time work (see Manning and Petrongolo, 2005, pp. 7-8). If this is the case then 
we should not hold these variables fixed when imputing full-time wages for non-full-time workers. 
17 Full-time and part-time status are self-defined in both the UKTUS and the QLFS.   22 
g QLFS FT FTgi FTgi x w , , ˆ ' ˆ ln b =  
where  QLFS FT, ˆ b  is the coefficient vector estimated on the QLFS, i indexes individuals and g 
indexes gender. No correction is made for work history as it is unavailable in the UKTUS, so 
the identifying assumption is made that the distribution of unobserved effects is the same for 
full-time  workers  in  both  the  UKTUS  and  QLFS.  If  this  assumption  is  valid,  then  the 
predicted wage is a consistent estimate of the individual’s expected full-time wage.  
 
For part-time and non-workers we explicitly assume that the full-time wage an individual 
could  receive  is  lower  than  a  current  full-time  worker  with  equivalent  observable 
characteristics, for the reasons outlined above.  This is operationalised by assuming that the 
potential  wage  of  individuals  in  this  group  is  a  draw  from  the  25
th  percentile  of  the 
conditional  full-time  wage  distribution.  We  use  the  technique  of  quantile  regression  to 
estimate the coefficients on observable characteristics at this point of the distribution, and 
then use these coefficients to predict the wage. The predicted wage for non-full-time workers 
is hence 
25
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A similar technique has been used by Devereux (2004) amongst others to impute wages for 
non-working women. Details of the estimated parameters of the wage equations are given in 
Appendix  Table  A2.  We  choose  this  method  largely  because  it  directly  incorporates  the 
insights from theory that the potential full-time wages of individuals who have not chosen to 
work  full-time  will  be  lower  than  those  observed  amongst  current  full-time  workers.  A 
number of alternative methods for predicting wages are outlined in Appendix B, and the 
sensitivity of our results to the prediction method is explored in Section 5.4. A second reason 
for favouring the prediction method outlined here is that the assumption that wages fall at the 
25 percentile is transparent and simple – the alternative methods outlined in Appendix B 
require a series of more complicated assumptions in order to derive the predicted wage. 
 
Theoretical models of time allocation stress the importance of household non-labour income 
as well as wage rates in individual decision-making. Income that is exogenous to the labour 
supply  decisions  of  the  household  members  is  not  measured  well  in  the  UKTUS  and  is   23 
unlikely to play an important role in the budget constraints of most families
18. Benefit income 
should not be used as a control because means-testing ensures that it is not held fixed as 
labour supply decisions vary. A dummy for receipt of any rental or interest income by the 
household is our best available measure of exogenous household income. Its inclusion in the 
specification reported in Table 8 revealed no significant association with market or domestic 
labour supplies and so we choose not to include it in other specifications.  
 
The use of variables such as education, health and region to predict the wage precludes their 
inclusion as explanatory variables in the labour supply equations. Clearly if all such variables 
were included as controls, they would be perfectly multi-collinear with the predicted wage. 
The inclusion of only a sub-set would enable estimation of the labour supply equations but 
would confuse the interpretation of the coefficients on the wage. This is because there is no 
idiosyncratic  variation  in  predicted  wages  so  there  is  virtually  no  overlap,  for  example, 
between the predicted wages of highly-educated and less-educated individuals. The inclusion 
of education as a control in addition to the wage then captures two off-setting effects. Highly-
educated individuals appear to work less then less-educated individuals, but this is cancelled 
out by the fact that their uniformly higher predicted wages are associated with longer hours of 
work. An example of the impact of adding a selection of controls is shown in Table 8, but we 
do  not  emphasise  these  results  because  of  the  problem  of  interpretation.  Note  that  the 
exclusion of education as a control in labour supply equations is not necessarily a drawback. 
Pencavel (1998) argues that the most interesting work-wage equations are those that do not 
hold education fixed. This is because individuals make schooling choices that affect wages 
and thus labour supply incentives. Part of the impact of wages on work hours will come via 
these schooling choices, which are netted out if schooling is held constant. 
 
We do, however, make two exceptions to the rule of excluding control variables. We include 
detailed controls on the number and age of children in the household because it is the role of 
women in the bearing and rearing of children that is the basis for the argument that women 
have  a  biological  advantage  in  domestic  work  (for  example,  because  of  the  ability  to 
                                                 
18 There are no questions in the UKTUS on the amounts of income received from different sources (although 
there are yes/no questions on  whether the household receives any income from a particular source). Gross 
household income is reported only in 11 broad groupings.   24 
breastfeed). It also seems likely that social norms regarding appropriate gender roles work to 
differentiate the behaviour of parents in particular. The inclusion of controls for children can 
then throw light on the question of how important gender differences in the process of raising 
children are in explaining the overall gender division of labour. The second set of control 
variables is a set of 4 dummy variables capturing the broad age group of the individual. 
Whilst age does play a role in predicting the wage, there is sufficient within-group variation 
in  the  wage  that  the  problem  of  collinearity  is  limited.  The  set  of  controls  allow  for 
systematic differences over the life-cycle in market and domestic work behaviour. As our 
data our cross-sectional, these age dummies are indistinguishable from cohort dummies and 
hence will also capture any effects of differing social norms between generations.  
 
The final issue in our choice of explanatory variables comes in how the spouse’s wage should 
enter an individual’s labour supply equations. We specify work hours as a function of the 
absolute level of an individual’s own wage and their wage relative to that of their spouse (i.e. 
work hours are a function of  i w  and  s i w w  where  i w  is the individual’s wage and  s w  is the 
wage of his or her spouse).  The first term captures the role of the wage as the value of non-
market time in terms of foregone earnings. As the wage increases, individuals may find that 
the additional consumption generated by an hour’s work at the margin is more than sufficient 
to compensate for an hour’s reduction in domestic production and/or leisure. Gender wage 
differences would generate a gender division of labour via this mechanism, even if spouses 
behaved as isolated individuals with no potential for intra-household exchange. The relative 
wage term captures the degree to which the individual has an intra-household advantage or 
disadvantage in terms of earnings capacity. The higher an individual’s relative wage, the 
greater the individual’s incentive to substitute hours of market work for hours of domestic 
work and engage in intra-household trade. Higher relative wages may also be associated with 
greater  intra-household  bargaining  power,  although  it  is  not  clear  how  we  would  expect 
bargaining power to influence the allocation of time. Individuals may use their bargaining 
power to increase their hours of leisure, for example, but whether this comes at the expense 
of less market or less domestic work depends on the relative disutility of time in each sector.  
 
Table 1 gives summary statistics on the variables used in our analysis. For the sample as a 
whole, we see that on average men spend around 44 hours a week in paid work and around   25 
18 hours a week in unpaid work. Women spend on average only 26 hours a week in paid 
work - 18 hours less than men - but around 35 hours a week in unpaid work, or 17 hours 
more than men. Average leisure times are hence roughly equal. Virtually all men and women 
participated in some form of domestic work over the two diary days, but differential labour 
market participation rates play a substantial role in the magnitude of the market work gap. 
Male predicted wages are, on average, £1.60 an hour higher than women’s predicted wages. 
Relative  wages  will  be  determined  in  part  by  this  average  gender  wage  gap  but  also  by 
patterns  of  assortative  mating.  On  average,  the  husbands  in  our  sample  have  a  predicted 
earnings capacity that is around 50 percent higher than the earnings capacity of their wives. 
Comparison of the age/cohort groups reveals that the bulk of our sample is aged between 26 
and 55 and that husbands tend to be slightly older than their wives.  
 
When we divide the sample into households with and without children, we find that the 
sexual division of labour is far more marked in families with children, but remains substantial 
even when no children are present. The paid work gap is around 25 hours a week when 
children are present, and around 10 hours a week in childless couples. Childless women are 
more likely to participate in the labour market than mothers, whilst the reverse is true of 
childless men with respect to fathers. The unpaid work gap mirrors the paid work gap across 
the two types of household, so that for both sub-groups average leisure times are again equal. 
Interestingly, male hours of unpaid work seem little affected by the presence of children - 
fathers spend on average just under two hours a week more in unpaid work than childless 
men.  Mothers,  however,  spend  around  15  hours  a  week  more  in  unpaid  work  than  their 
childless counterparts. It is notable that the average combined amount of household work 
hours over both sectors is larger in households where children are present, at around 130 
hours for parents and 110 hours for childless couples. This difference reflects entirely a 20-
hour differential in total domestic work, as total hours of market work are the same, on 
average, between the two groups at around 70. Greater gender specialisation amongst couples 
when children are present is accompanied by greater gender wage differences. The average 
male wage is £3.10 higher than the average female wage in the sample with children, but only 
£2 higher in the sample without children. These differences are reflected in intra-household 
relative wages, where the male advantage is substantially higher in households with children. 
Theory would suggest that the gains to a division of labour are greater when a) more work is   26 
required in total and b) the wage differential between the spouses is larger. These summary 
statistics are consistent with the view that the degree of specialisation observed in practice is 
related to the magnitude of the potential gains to that specialisation. Whether this observation 
holds  on  an  individual  household  level,  however,  cannot  be  inferred  from  the  aggregate 
statistics. 
 
The last columns of Table 1 provide summary statistics for the sample of two-earner couples. 
Even when both spouses participate in the labour market, substantial market and domestic 
work gaps of around 12 hours each emerge. Given that large gender wage differences are 
observed amongst this sub-sample, it appears that intra-household wage differences do not 
affect time allocation solely through labour market participation decisions, but also through 
hours of work conditional on participation.  
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4. Methodology 
 
4.1 Decomposition methodology 
Drawing on the method proposed by Yun (2004), we specify that the labour supply to sector 
Y of an individual of gender g in household i can be written 
  gi gi g gi F Y w m + = ) , ( W   (1) 
  N i ,..., 1 =  households 
  B A g , =  (male and female) 
(The use of the Y, A and B notation allows the model to be generalised to incorporate both the 
market and domestic work gaps.)  ) (× F  is a function left undefined at present;  g m  is a gender 
fixed  effect;  gi W  is  a  vector  of  variables  capturing  the  individual’s  absolute  and  relative 
predicted wage rates; and  gi w  is a random error term that is orthogonal to the elements in 
) (× F . We assume that  gi w  is mean-zero, and hence can write 
) , ( gi g gi F Y W m =  
where the ‘over-bar’ denotes the sample mean of a random variable over the population of 
individuals of gender g. 
 
The difference in the sample means of Y by each gender group can be decomposed into: 
{ } { } ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( B B B A B A A A B A F F F F Y Y W W W W m m m m - + - = -   (2) 
where we have dropped the household i subscript for convenience. The first term in curly 
brackets on the right-hand side of (2) is the ‘wage effect’ – it is the part of the gender gap in 
outcomes that would remain if individuals were essentially identical, and differed only in 
their absolute and relative wage rates. The second term in curly brackets is the ‘gender effect’ 
– the part of the gender gap in outcomes that would remain if absolute and relative wages 
were, on average, the same for both gender groups.  It is clear that (2) gives only one of two 
possible decompositions. It uses the behaviour of gender group A as reference and calculates 
(i) how much of the gender gap in outcomes would remain if individuals of gender B supplied 
the same hours as individuals of gender A with the same absolute and relative wage (wage 
effect); and (ii) how much of the gender gap would remain if average absolute and relative   28 
wages for both groups were equalised at the mean of group B individuals (gender effect). The 
alternative decomposition takes the behaviour of gender group B as reference, and asks: how 
much of the gender gap would remain if individuals of gender A supplied the same hours as 
individuals of gender B with the same wages, and how much would remain if, on average, 
wages of both were equalised at the mean of group A individuals? Formally, the alternative 
decomposition is: 
{ } { } ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( A B A A B B A B B A F F F F Y Y W W W W m m m m - + - = -  
All results in this paper are presented using first the male equation as reference and then the 
female equation.  
 
Next we place the restriction on the way in which the arguments enter the function  ) (× F  such 




g gi g g gi g gi g r w F F F b b m b m m + + = + = W W , where w is the absolute wage, r 
is the relative wage and 
w
g b  and 
r
g b  are their respective coefficients. Yun (2004) shows we 
can  break  down  the  overall  wage  effect  into  a  component  due  to  gender  differences  in 
absolute wages and a component due to gender differences in relative wages. The share of the 


















where the g subscript on the b ’s is equal to A if group A is the reference group and B if 
group  B  is  the  chosen  reference  group.  The  absolute  wage  effect  reported  in  the  results 
section is hence  { } ) , ( ) , ( B g A g w F F S W W m m - ´ . The share of the wage effect accounted for 

















The  absolute  wage  effect  give  us  an  indication  of  how  far  higher  average  male  wages 
influence the gender work gap via a higher cost to males of non-market time in terms of 
foregone earnings. The relative wage effect measures the importance of the average male 
intra-household wage advantage that generates gains to a traditional intra-household division 
of labour and may be associated with greater male intra-household bargaining power.  
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Demographic controls such as educational attainment are not included in our specification for 
the reasons outlined in Section 3.2. However, we do allow the gender fixed effect to vary 
with  the  number  and  age  of  children  in  the  household  and  the  age/cohort  group  of  the 
individual. We specify 
g gi g i g g l g h m ' ' T C + + =  
where  i C  is a vector of variables capturing the number and age of children (note there is no g 
subscript on  i C  as  i C  contains household-level variables),  gi T  is as a set of dummies for 
each age/cohort group,  g g  and  g l are their respective parameter vectors and  g h  is a constant 
fixed gender effect that applies equally to all individuals of gender g. 
 
Yun’s detailed decomposition technique allows us to identify the share of the overall gender 
effect that relates to the differing behaviours of men and women when children are present in 
the household. The weight given to the ‘child effect’ in the overall gender effect (using group 
g as reference) is 
( ) ( ) ( ) B A g j B B A A B A B A
B A
C S
b b l l g g h h
g g
- + - + - + -
-
=
¹ ' ' ' ) ( '
) ( '
W T T C
C
 
and its overall magnitude is given by  { } ) , ( ) , ( g j B g j A C F F S ¹ ¹ - ´ W W m m . The contribution of 
gender-specific  behaviours  surrounding  children  to  the  gender  work  gaps  is  of  interest 
because it seems likely that both biology and social norms work to differentiate the behaviour 
of parents more strongly than the behaviour of childless individuals. The residual gender 
effect, i.e. the part not explained by gender differences surrounding children, can be thought 
of as an effect that applies to all individuals of a given gender, regardless of fertility. 
 
Note that in traditional decomposition terminology, the fact that the men in our sample are, 
on average, slightly older than their spouses would form part of the ‘characteristics’ effects 
along with what we have termed the wage effect. The residual gap in outcomes, net of these 
two components, is traditionally termed the ‘coefficients’ effect. We choose to combine the 
effect of the gender age differential ( B A T T - ) with the coefficients effect in what we term the 
gender effect. We argue that the fact that women tend to marry men who are slightly older 
than themselves is best thought of as a gender effect, in the sense that it reflects a structural   30 




4.2 Econometric model 
Define 
g Y gi g Y gi g Y i g Y g Y gi , , , , , ' ' ' ' b l g h q W T C X + + + º  
where  H L Y , =  indexes market and domestic labour supply respectively. We estimate a four-
equation system of household labour supplies of the form 
gi L   gi L g L gi , , ' e q + = X    if  0 ' , , > + gi L g L gi e q X       (3) 
0 =       otherwise 
gi H   gi H g H gi , , ' e q + = X   
N i ,..., 1 =  households 
f m g , =  (male and female) 
 
The  specification  allows  for  the  censoring  of  market  labour  supplies  (L),  but  specifies 
household labour supplies (H) as a linear function of the independent variables because of the 
infrequency of limit observations – less than 1% of women and 4% of men report zero hours 
of household work on both diary days. In contrast, 13% of men and 30% of women do not 
participate in the labour market. The adoption of a linear functional form for market labour 
supplies,  therefore,  would  bias  the  coefficient  estimates  towards  zero  (and  more  so  for 
women than for men), leading to under-estimation of the wage and child effects. The form of 
these  equations  defines  the  choice  of  the  ) (× F  function  used  in  calculating  the 
decompositions. 
 
Since we can write 
gi gi gi gi g Y E Y w + = ) , | ( X  
where  gi w  is a random mean-zero error term, it follows from (1) that the choice of  ) (× F  
function is  ) , | ( ) , ( g Y E F gi gi gi g X W = m . For the simple linear case of domestic labour supply   31 
this  simplifies  to  g H gi gi g
H F , ˆ ' ) , ( q m X W = ,  where  the  H  superscript  denotes  that  the  ) (× F  
function is different for market and domestic labour supplies and a ‘hat’ over a coefficient 
denotes its estimated value. The domestic work gap can hence be written in standard linear 
decomposition form (using group g as the reference group) as: 
  m f H H -   ) , ( ) , ( m m
H
f f
H F F W W m m - =  
m H m f H f , , ˆ ' ˆ ' q q X X - =  
( ) ( ) m H f H g j g H m f , , , ˆ ˆ ' ˆ ' q q q - + - = ¹ X X X  
( ) { } ( ) ( ) { } m H f H g j g H m f g H m f , , , , ˆ ˆ ' ˆ ' ˆ ' q q l b - + - + - = ¹ X T T W W  
where the last line gives the wage effect as the first term in curly brackets and the gender 
effect  in  the  second  bracketed  term.  Application  of  the  formulae  for  the  detailed 
decompositions shows that the expressions for the absolute and relative wage effects and the 
child effect collapse to the familiar linear forms 
w
g B A w w b ) ( - , 
r
g B A r r b ) ( - , and  ) ( ' B A g g - C . 
 
The tobit specification adopted to deal with the problem of censored market labour supplies 
means  that  the  function  ) , ( gi g
L F W m  is  not  a  simple  linear  function  of  the  independent 
variables. Rather, it takes the form of the expression for the expected value of a latent normal 
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Z g L E F
f
s q m X X W  
where  g L, ˆ s  is the estimated standard error of  gi L, e ;  ( ) g L g L gi gi Z , , ˆ ˆ ' ˆ s q X = ; and  () × f  and  () × F   
are the standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions respectively.  
 
Bauer and Sinning (2005) show that there are two possible methods of implementing the 
decomposition of a tobit model, depending on which  g L, ˆ s  is used in the counterfactual parts 
of the decomposition equation. Hence the counterfactual  ) , ( B A
L F W m , for example, may be 
estimated using  ) ˆ , ˆ ( B A A
L F W , s q  or  ) ˆ , ˆ ( B B A
L F W , s q .  In  this paper we  employ the first of 
these two formulations. Bauer and Sinning implement an empirical example and show that in   32 
that case, the tobit specification is an improvement over the OLS specification in general, but 
there are no significant differences in the results depending on which  g L, ˆ s  is used. 
 
In order to estimate the model given in (3) we make the identifying assumptions that 
0 ) , ( , = gi gi Y Cov X e ; Y = L,H; g = m,f. The error terms can hence be thought of as individual 
random effects that are, by construction, orthogonal to gender, spouses’ predicted wage rates, 
age/cohort group and the presence of children. We allow for the fact that these random effects 
are likely to be correlated within a household, both for a given individual and between 
spouses, and produce estimates of these correlations. Specifically, we assume that the vector 
of error terms are jointly normally distributed,  ) , ( ~ S 0 ε NID i , where  
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Estimation  is  carried  out  via  maximum  likelihood.  The  form  of  the  contribution  to  the 
likelihood of each household i depends on whether one, both or none of the spouses’ market 
labour  supplies  are  censored.  Define  ( )'
* * * *
fi mi fi mi
*
i H H L L = y  as  the  vector  of  latent 
labour supplies. Our model specifies that observed labour supplies are given by 
*
gi gi H H =  
*
gi gi L L =  if  0
* > gi L  
0 = gi L  if  0
* £ gi L  
Our assumption is that the joint density of 
*
i y  is multivariate normal, with mean-vector 
( )' ' ' ' ' ' , , , , f H fi m H mi f L fi m L mi i q q q q q X X X X X =  and covariance matrix S, i.e. 
( ) ) , ' ( S = q i
*
i NID f X y . 
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In  the  simplest  case,  both  spouses  participate  in  the  labour  market  and  the  densities  of 
observed and latent labour supplies coincide. The likelihood contribution of household i is 
simply: 
( ) { } ) ' ( )' ' ( 2 1 exp ) (det ) 2 (
1 2 1 2 q q p i i i i i i f L X y X y y - S - - S = =
- - -  
Where at least one spouse does not participate in the labour market we must integrate over 
the part of the joint density that relates to negative values of the latent variables 
*
mi L  and/or 
*
fi L . Define 
U
i y  as the vector of uncensored variables ( mi H , fi H  and possibly one of  mi L  or 
fi L )  and 
* C
i y  as  the  vector  of  censored  variables  (one  or  both  of 
*
mi L  and 
*
fi L ),  such  that 






i y y y = . The likelihood contribution is given by  { } ∫ £ =
*








y y . 
 
The presence of the double integral in the likelihood contribution of no-earner households 
means that in this case it has no closed-form solution. We use the technique of maximum 
simulated likelihood to approximate the likelihood contribution in these cases (see Appendix 
C for further details of the MSL procedure). Calculations were performed in Stata 8.0 and 
maximise  the  user-defined  log  likelihood  by  the  linear-form  method.  The  number  of 
replications used in simulating the likelihood is set at 20 (following Prowse, 2004). Starting 
values were derived from single-equation OLS estimates and estimates typically converged in 
around 9 iterations. 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Model selection 
It is not clear a priori which is the correct functional form for specifying the relationship 
between absolute and relative wage rates and hours of work. An incorrect specification could 
lead to highly misleading estimates of the effects of wages on the allocation of time. We 
explore whether the absolute and relative wage terms should enter linearly, in logs or in 
quadratic form, and use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to discriminate between non-
nested models. The AIC statistic is calculated for each model using the formula 
) 1 ( 2 ) ln( 2 + + - = p L AIC  
where L is the likelihood and p is the number of elements in the parameter vector. The lower 
the AIC, the better the model
19. Table 2 shows the AIC for seven models (ranked by AIC) 
and implies that the preferred model specifies that the absolute wage enters in quadratic form 
and the relative wage in log form. This, then, is the specification used throughout the paper.  
 
5.2 Parameter estimates 
Table 3 shows estimates of the model parameters for the full sample of 1170 couples. Note 
that marginal effects in the market work equations relate to the latent variable L* and so are 
not directly comparable with marginal effects in the domestic work equations. Absolute wage 
variables  are  mean-centred  around  the  mean  for  all  individuals  in  the  sample  (£7.70  per 
hour). This has no effect on the magnitude or significance of the parameter estimates, the log 
likelihood,  etc.,  but  does  give  the  constant  a  meaningful  interpretation.  In  this  case,  the 
constant corresponds to the expected hours of work of a reference individual who is childless, 
age 36-45, with a wage of £7.70 per hour and a relative wage of 1 (i.e. equal wage to spouse). 
 
The  first  two  rows  of  Table  3  show  that  the  level  of  an  individual’s  potential  earnings 
capacity is strongly associated with the allocation of time to both domestic and market work. 
The  relationships  are  non-linear,  and  appear  similar  for  both  men  and  women.  Figure  2 
illustrates the relationships implied by the estimated coefficients for the reference individual. 
It  shows  that  our  estimates  provide  strong  evidence  of  backward-bending  market  labour 
                                                 
19 See for example Cameron and Trivedi (2005), pp. 278.   35 
supply behaviour – past a certain point higher wages are associated with fewer hours supplied 
to the market, presumably as a result of income effects. This relationship holds for both men 
and women, although women supply less hours to the market than men at all wage rates. The 
gender difference in the relationship between wages and hours of market work is smaller 
amongst  individuals  with  lower  potential  wages,  all  else  constant,  and becomes  larger  at 
higher wage rates. The plots for hours of domestic work show an opposite trend – individuals 
with higher wages spend less time in domestic work up to a point, beyond which further 
wage increases are associated with increases in time allocated to domestic work. Again, we 
see a similar relationship amongst both men and women, but with an intercept shift such that 
men spend less time in domestic work than women with identical wages.  
 
Taken alongside the plots of market hours of work, Figure 2 suggests that domestic work 
contains an element of leisure, or joint production. For very low earners, the income gain 
from additional market hours is not sufficient to compensate for the loss of leisure and the 
output  from  domestic  production.  For  slightly  higher  earners,  the  trade-off  becomes 
favourable,  and  greater  time  in  the  market  is  chosen  at  the  expense  of  both  leisure  and 
domestic  work  time.  This  suggests  that  to  some  degree  purchased  goods  and  services, 
financed  by  market  work,  can  substitute  for  domestically-produced  goods  and  services 
(through  the  purchase  of  labour-saving  devices,  childcare,  restaurant  meals,  etc.).  The 
potential for this type of substitution at moderate wage rates appears limited, however, as 
higher-wage individuals cut back on leisure time as well as domestic work. For very high-
earners, additional hours of market work are again insufficient to compensate for lost leisure 
and  domestic  output.  Once  a  desired  level  of  income  is  attained,  individuals  prefer  to 
consume leisure and produce domestic output rather than substitute additional earnings for 
non-market time. It seems likely that the composition of domestic work will be different 
among individuals with different wage rates. The domestic work undertaken by those with 
high wage rates can be thought of a luxury in the sense that it may require inputs of both time 
and  money  that  together  are  outside  the  budget  constraints  of  lower  earners  (home 
improvements,  elaborate  dinner  parties,  and  food  shopping  in  delicatessens  rather  than 
supermarkets may be examples). The hypothesis that domestic work can contain elements of   36 
leisure has been explored both theoretically and empirically
20, and appears to be supported by 
Figure 2. Note that this contrasts with the assumption made in branches of the sociological 
literature that domestic work is a source of disutility that individuals seek to minimise via the 
exercise of bargaining power 
21. 
 
The remaining coefficients in Table 3 serve to shift the curves shown in Figure 2 vertically up 
or down. The coefficients of the relative wage reveal the striking feature that husbands’ hours 
of work are insensitive to the earnings capacity of their wives. For women, however, the 
strength of their intra-household labour market position matters for the allocation of time. 
Wives  whose  earnings  capacity  exceeds  their  husband’s,  for  example,  work  more  in  the 
market than more traditional wives and also spend less time in domestic work. It is difficult 
to  view  these  results  as  evidence  of  a  division  of  labour  along  the  lines  of  comparative 
advantage. The logic of gains to specialisation suggests that, for a given number of market 
hours supplied by the household, total income will be maximised if the higher-earning partner 
contributes a higher share of those hours and the lower-earning partner a lower share. The 
greater  the  gap  in  earnings  capacity  between  the  spouses,  the  greater  the  incentive  for  a 
division of labour. Whilst we do find that women’s market hours rise as the gain to male 
specialisation in market work falls, there is no accompanying reduction in male market hours 
or increase in male domestic hours. Hence there is little evidence that relatively high-earning 
wives specialise in market work and ‘trade’ earnings for increased domestic output produced 
by their husbands. Given the insensitivity of male labour supply, it is possible that we are 
observing an income effect – holding their own wage constant, women in households with 
relatively low-earning husbands must work longer in the market to enjoy the same levels of 
household  income  as  women  with  higher-earning  husbands.  This  suggests  a  model  of 
behaviour termed the ‘traditional family model’ by Lundberg (1988). The model specifies an 
asymmetric  pair  of  labour  supply  functions  in  which  husband  and  wife  maximise  utility 
independently. Married men’s decisions are a function of their own wage and household non-
labour income alone, whilst married women treat men’s earnings as a component of non-
labour  income  when  forming  their  labour  supply  decisions.  As  Lundberg  argues,  the 
                                                 
20 See Pollak and Wachter (1975) for a theoretical discussion of joint production and Graham and Green (1984) 
and Kooreman and Kerkhofs (2003) for empirical treatments. 
21 Bianchi et al. (2000) provide a summary of the ‘relative resources’ perspective.   37 
traditional  family  assumption  has  been  common  in  both  ‘first-‘  and  ‘second-generation’ 
empirical studies of labour supply, usually for reasons of convenience and data availability, 
despite the fact that it cannot be derived from optimising models of household behaviour. 
Lundberg suggests that the model can be thought of as an approximation to the case where 
changes in wife’s market hours are a marginal substitution of market income for the value of 
home production and thus have an insignificant impact on household income. The results in 
Table  3  suggest  that  this  approximation  is  not  a  bad  one,  as  wives  with  lower-earning 
husbands, and hence lower ‘other income’ do appear to trade hours of domestic for hours of 
market  work.  If  the  relative  wage  is  taken  as  an  indicator  of  intra-household  bargaining 
power, these results suggest that women with more power are able to substitute hours of 
domestic work with hours of market work. This interpretation is only valid, however, under 
the assumption that domestic work carries a disutility relative to market work.  
 
The presence of children in the household is associated amongst women with large decreases 
in market labour supply and large increases in domestic labour supply. The magnitude of 
these effects diminishes with the age of the child, to the extent that the presence of a child age 
10  to  15  is  not  associated  with  any  reduction  in  market  labour  supply  amongst  women. 
Children  have  no  significant  effect  on  the  market  labour  supply  of  men  at  all,  which 
reinforces the finding that male labour supply decisions are made without reference to the 
characteristics of the household in which they live. Children, particularly those aged under 3, 
are associated with increases in men’s domestic work, but of much smaller magnitudes than 
for women. 
 
The set of age/cohort dummies in Table 3 allows for differences in time allocation that occur 
over the life-cycle, or because of changing social norms amongst younger generations. Both 
men and women in older age groups allocate less time to the market than those in younger 
generations, with a particularly sharp reduction after the age of 55. Older generations also 
allocate more time to domestic work than their younger counterparts, this being the case for 
both men and women. 
 
Table 3 also contains estimates of the covariance parameters between the errors in the labour 
supply  equations.  Calculations  of  the  standard  errors  and  correlations  implied  by  these   38 
coefficients  are  provided  below  the  estimates.  Three  of  the  cross-equation  correlations 
between errors are significantly different from zero, which suggests that the simultaneous 
equation model is an improvement over single equation specifications. We can think of the 
errors as random, idiosyncratic effects that relate to unobserved differences in tastes and/or 
productivities. These random effects are, by construction, orthogonal to gender, household 
wage rates, the presence and age of children and age/cohort group. For both men and women, 
an individual’s market and domestic work time errors are negatively correlated, as we would 
expect  if  purchased  and  domestically-produced  goods  are  substitutes.  We  also  find  a 
significant  positive  correlation  between  the  male  and  female  labour  supply  errors.  This 
suggests that there are complementarities in spousal market labour supply, perhaps because 
of shared tastes for consumption versus domestically-produced goods, or because of rigidities 
in  the  tax/benefit  system  and  variations  in  local  labour  market  conditions.  There  is  no 
evidence of intra-household, as opposed to individual specialisation. If specialisation were 
important we would expect to find negative correlations between spouses’ labour supplies to 
the market, and/or to the domestic sector. This pattern would arise if, for example, spouses 
divided  a  given  amount  of  work  hours  according  to  which  partner  was  most  productive. 
Equally, we find no evidence of intra-household trade, in the sense that individuals who work 
unusually long hours in one sector do not tend to be compensated by higher spousal labour 
supply to the alternative sector. 
 
5.3 Decomposition results 
Table 4 presents the results of the decomposition of the market and domestic work gaps. The 
estimates in the first and third columns use the male behavioural response as reference. We 
can think of this as a counterfactual scenario in which women supply the same hours of 
labour as men with the same observed characteristics. Once we adjust for the fact that the 
wives in the sample are somewhat younger than husbands, in this scenario spouses differ only 
in their earnings capacity in the labour market. Hence the ‘wage effect’ is the remaining gap 
in work times that can be attributed solely to gender differences in wage rates. The female 
reference equation takes the opposite counterfactual – that the behaviour of husbands with a 
given absolute and relative wage, age, and number and age of children is the same as the 
behaviour of wives with the same characteristics. Results using both reference equations are 
presented here, and hence show the sensitivity of our results to the underlying behavioural   39 
assumption. The detailed decomposition allows us to explore how far the wage effect reflects 
differences in the absolute earnings capacities of individuals and how far it reflects intra-
household incentives for a traditional sexual division of labour. We also isolate the impact of 
gender-specific behaviours surrounding children, which gives some indication of how far 
gender differences in biological and cultural constraints are associated with parenthood, and 
how far they apply to all men and women regardless of fertility.  
 
The decomposition of the market work gap shows that gender differences in earnings ability 
can  account  for  around  7.5  hours,  or  just  under  half,  of  the  overall  17.7  hour  gap.  The 
estimates are remarkably consistent whether the male or female equation is used as reference. 
This  suggests  that  gender  wage  differences  play  an  important  role  in  the  couples’  time 
allocation  decisions  with  respect  to  market  work.  Regardless  of  gender,  individuals  with 
higher earnings capacity allocate more time to market work.  Nevertheless, just over half of 
the market work gap would persist even if the earnings capacities of men and women were, 
on average, equal. The decomposition of the domestic work gap shows a wage effect that is 
smaller and varies more with the choice of reference equation.  Somewhere between one-
sixth  and  one-third  of  the  domestic  work  gap  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  higher-wage 
individuals  devote  less  time  to  domestic  work.  It  appears  that  female  specialisation  in 
domestic  work  can  be  explained  only  partially  by  the  fact  that  the  foregone  earnings 
associated with an hour of non-market time are lower for women than for men. Wages are of 
second-order importance in domestic labour supply as an individual’s sex is a far stronger 
predictor of their time allocation. 
 
These results suggest that differences in the wage rates of individuals, regardless of gender, 
can account for a large fraction of the observed male specialisation in market work amongst 
married  couples.  These  wage  differences  are  less  strongly  associated  with  female 
specialisation in domestic work, however. Gender-specific biological and cultural constraints 
work to maintain a traditional division of labour in both sectors, but more so within the home 
than in the labour market. This implies that trends towards the equalisation of wage rates 
between the sexes will have a lop-sided impact of the sexual division of labour. Rates of 
labour  market  participation  and  hours  of  work  will  become  more  equal,  but  female 
responsibility for domestic tasks will be eroded to a lesser degree. This, of course, will slow   40 
change  in  the  labour  market  –  women’s  demand  for  part-time  work  and  occupational 
segregation will not be seriously challenged whilst women must juggle market and domestic 
production. It also suggests that trends towards gender equality in wages and market work 
hours will be associated with a reduction in women’s leisure time, as the degree to which 
purchased goods and services can substitute for domestic output appears limited.   
 
The detailed decomposition of the market work wage effect suggests the role of the absolute 
wage outweighs that of the relative wage in explaining gender differences in market work. 
Gender differences in the amount of income generated by an hour of market work account for 
between  29  and  44  percent  of  the  overall  market  work  gap,  whilst  differences  in  intra-
household advantages in market work account for between –2 and 14 percent of the gap. (The 
figure of –2 can be interpreted in terms of an effect that reduces, rather than adds to, the 
overall gap. Men who have a relative intra-household disadvantage in market work tend to 
work more, rather than less, in the market than men who have an advantage relative to their 
partner. Hence if women were to behave as men, their average relative disadvantage would 
lead them to supply more hours to the market than men, all else equal.) These results suggest 
that women work less in the market principally because the additional income generated by 
more market work is not sufficient to compensate for the accompanying reduction in leisure 
and/or the reduction in domestic output. This implies that at higher wage rates, the trade-off 
would become more favourable, and women would choose to supply  more labour to the 
market, perhaps using part of their additional earnings to purchase market-substitutes for 
domestic  output  such  as  childcare  or  prepared  meals.  The  fact  that  the  gains  to  intra-
household  specialisation  would be reduced as  women’s wages rise to  the level of men’s 
appears relatively unimportant – the size of the intra-household wage gap has only a minor 
influence on the way in which spouses choose to allocate market time. 
 
In contrast, the detailed decomposition of the wage effect in domestic work shows that intra-
household wage differences are equally, if not more, important in determining the allocation 
of time to domestic work than variations in the absolute level of the wage. Households in 
which the gain to a division of labour is greater exhibit a greater degree of specialisation in 
domestic work. Hence the fact that men have an intra-household wage advantage accounts for 
between 7 and 25 percent of the overall domestic work gap. In fact, as our discussion of the   41 
underlying model estimates in Table 3 revealed, it seems to be only the behaviour of women 
that is modified in response to differences in the earnings capacities of the spouses. Where 
the gain to a traditional division of labour is smaller, women tend to allocate their time more 
equally between the market and the domestic sphere. There is no evidence, however, that the 
work times of men become equalised between the two sectors in response to a fall in the 
gains to traditional specialisation. 
 
Turning to the effects of children on time allocation, we see that gender-specific differences 
in the labour supply of parents accounts for around a third of the market work gap and for a 
slightly  higher  proportion  of  the  domestic  work  gap.  If  spouses  modified  market  labour 
supply by the same amount when children are present in the household, relative to the hours 
they would supply in the absence of children, the gender gap in market work would shrink by 
around five and half hours and the gap in domestic work by around six hours. Elimination of 
these differences in behaviour between men and women would reduce the market work gap 
by about the same magnitude as elimination of gender wage differences, but would have a 
relatively larger impact on the domestic work gap. Gender differences in market work are 
largest when children aged under 3 are present in the household and are virtually zero for 
children aged 10 and above. Gaps in domestic work vary somewhat less with the age of 
children. Whether the differential responses reflect biological differences in ability at caring 
for children, cultural norms or gender differences in preferences is impossible to say. It is 
notable, however, that even when differential responses to the presence of children are netted 
out, a substantial unexplained gender effect remains that is common to all individuals of a 
given  sex.  Hence  it  seems  likely  that  biological  differences  in  comparative  advantage 
between men and women, which presumably relate largely to differences in childbirth and 
child-rearing, are insufficient to explain the observed division of labour.    
 
5.4 Sensitivity analysis 
Table 5 explores the robustness of the decomposition estimates to the definition of market 
and domestic work (full model estimates are given in Appendix Table A3). The top panel 
shows our original estimates for comparison. The second panel shows the effect of excluding 
travel and commuting time from our definitions of market and domestic work. The magnitude 
of the market and domestic work gaps fall by around 2 hours a week each, suggesting that   42 
travel times are proportional to the number of hours spent working in each sector. Men spend 
longer, on average, commuting to market work than women, and so excluding travel-to-work 
time  narrows  estimates  of  gender  differences  in  market  labour  supply.  Similarly,  women 
spend longer than men, on average, in travel related to household and family care and this 
additional  travel  time  contributes  to  the  domestic  work  gap.  Estimates  of  the  relative 
contributions of wage effects and of gender-specific behaviours surrounding children to the 
observed gaps are virtually unchanged, however. 
 
The  third  panel  of  Table  5  explores  the  effects  of  including  secondary  time  uses  in  the 
definition of domestic and market work. This increases the magnitudes of both the market 
and domestic work gaps, but more so for the domestic work gap which rises by around 4 
hours per week. This suggests that women engage in ‘multi-tasking’ to a greater degree than 
men,  and  are  more  likely  to  combine  domestic  work  tasks  with  leisure  activities.  The 
contribution of gender differences surrounding children to the domestic work gap is slightly 
larger in these estimates, which is consistent with the combination of childcare with other 
domestic tasks. Estimates of relative magnitudes of the wage and gender effects, however, are 
again largely unchanged. 
 
The final panel of Table 5 follows Bianchi et al. (2000) in recoding extreme values that are 
likely to introduce error into reports of time use. We recode all estimates that are extremely 
high (exceeding the 95
th percentile of the distribution) back to the 95
th percentile. Bianchi et 
al. argue that this truncation of the range helps to eliminate the most error-prone estimates 
from  the  data.  The  recoding  leads  to  a  reduction  in  the  size  of  both  gaps,  but  a  larger 
reduction in the domestic than the market work gap. The relative magnitudes of the wage and 
gender effects, however, do not appear sensitive to the presence of outliers. 
 
Table  6  explores  the  robustness  of  the  decomposition  estimates  to  differing  assumptions 
regarding the prediction of individual wages. Full details of the different methodologies used 
are given in Appendix B and model estimates are given in Appendix Table A4. Again, our 
preferred  estimates  are  given  in  the  top  panel  for  comparison.  Table  7  gives  summary 
statistics on the wage distributions produced under each assumption.  
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The decompositions shown in the second, third and fourth panels of Table 6 give somewhat 
smaller estimates of the impact of gender wage differences in explaining the market and 
domestic work gaps than our preferred specification, whilst the estimates in the last panel are 
somewhat  larger.  It  is  noticeable  that  in  each  case,  however,  the  contribution  of  wage 
differences to the market work gap is greater than to the domestic work gap, suggesting that 
our finding of asymmetric effects between the market and domestic sectors is robust. Note 
also that in each case, the absolute level of an individual’s earnings capacity is relatively 
more  important  than  their  intra-household  wage  position  in  determining  market  labour 
supply, whilst the reverse is true for domestic labour supply.  
 
As Table 7 makes clear, the first three alternative methods result in the highest predictions of 
average female potential wages, and hence the smallest gender wage gaps. As discussed in 
Appendix  B,  each  method  attempts  to  tackle  the  problem  of  unobserved  heterogeneity 
between full-time and non-full-time workers in a different way. In each of these three cases, 
however, it seems likely that we over-predict the potential full-time wages that would be 
available to individuals who do not currently work full-time. For example, controlling for 
differences in average months of continuous employment (estimates shown in the second 
panel) will correct for short-term differences in experience-related human capital between 
full-time  workers  and  non-full-time  workers,  but  not  for  longer-term  differences  in  work 
history or unobserved differences in ability or productivity.  
 
The Heckman-correction approach attempts to account for such factors in a parametric way, 
but is hampered by the lack of a valid exclusion restriction and possible misspecification of 
the underlying distribution of unobserved effects. As discussed in Appendix B, the Heckman 
selection term is negative in the female wage equation which implies that women who work 
full-time  earn  slightly  lower  wages  than  would  be  available  to  women  with  equivalent 
observable  characteristics  who  choose  not  to  work  full-time.  This  finding  contradicts 
theoretical  notions  that  individuals  with  positive  tastes  for  work  should  both  earn  higher 
wages and be more likely to work full-time. The finding is particularly suspect in this case 
because we do not control for differences in work history or job tenure because they are 
unavailable in the UKTUS. The implication of the Heckman estimates for women is then that 
the (presumably) greater labour market attachment of full-time workers is associated with   44 
lower wages, which seems nonsensical.  
 
The method shown in the fourth panel of Table 6 uses the wages of full-time workers who 
have been in their current employment for less than 6 months as the basis for the prediction 
of the potential wages of non-full-time workers. This method accounts for the lack of firm-
specific human capital amongst new entrants into full-time work, but again does not take into 
consideration that the unobserved characteristics of those beginning new full-time jobs are 
likely to be relatively positive, compared to individuals who have chosen not to work full-
time at all.  
 
Our preferred specification allows directly for the relatively negative characteristics of non-
full-time workers by assuming that the wage such an individual could receive, if they were to 
seek a full-time job, is a draw from the 25
th percentile of the conditional full-time wage 
distribution. Thus our method imposes a single transparent assumption about the unobserved 
heterogeneity between full-time and non-full-time workers that is in accordance with theories 
of individual utility maximisation. The choice of the 25
th percentile is, of course, to some 
degree  arbitrary,  but  represents  a  relatively  conservative  estimate  of  the  wage  penalty 
experienced by non-full-time workers. As Table 7 shows, gender wage differences are largest 
when we employ this method in general, and become even larger when the 10
th, rather than 
the 25
th, percentile is used.  It is unsurprising, then, that the decomposition shown in the 
bottom panel of Table 6, gives the largest estimates of the impact of gender wage differences 
on the intra-household division of labour.  
 
Table 8 presents results for the model with an additional set of demographic controls that are 
commonly included in market and domestic labour supply equations. As argued in Section 
3.2,  the  inclusion  of  such  controls  is  inappropriate  in  the  sense  that  it  confuses  the 
interpretation of the wage coefficients. Given that age, education and health status are used in 
the prediction of wage rates there is insufficient idiosyncratic variation in the wage to identify 
its impact separately to that of the demographic controls. To see this, note that the estimates 
in Table 8 suggest that an individual’s level of education is strongly negatively correlated 
with market work and strongly positively correlated with domestic work. But since highly-
educated individuals have, by construction, higher wages than those with less education, the   45 
coefficients on education are countered by wage effects of the opposite sign. Similarly, the 
inclusion  of  controls  for  relative  education  leads  to  an  increase  in  the  coefficient  on  the 
relative wage. Men who are more highly educated than their wives, for example, appear to 
spend less time in market work. But such men will have high relative wages and, according to 
the increased coefficient on this variable, spend longer in market work, thus cancelling out 
the relative education effect. 
 
Home and car ownership status are not used in the prediction of wage rates, but again are 
likely to confuse interpretation of the wage variables, as they depend on household income 
and are thus an outcome of household labour supply decisions. The negative association of 
rented tenure and market labour supply, for example, may simply reflect the fact that low-
wage individuals supply less labour to the market and hence have lower household income. 
Controlling for housing tenure thus removes part of the wage effect but housing tenure cannot 
be considered to be held constant as wages vary. The dummy for interest or rental income 
included in Table 8 is not statistically significant in any of the labour supply equations. As 
discussed in Section 3.2, this dummy is the best available measure we have of ‘household 
non-labour income’, i.e. income that is exogenous with respect to the labour supply decisions 
of the household. Receipt of benefit income is not included as means-testing ensures that, 
again, this is an outcome of the time allocation decision. 
   
5.5 Contrasting results for households with and without children 
Tables 9a and 9b contrasts models estimated separately on the sub-samples of households 
with and without children. Lundberg (1988) finds striking differences in the market labour 
supply behaviour of spouses depending on whether or not young children are present in the 
household. It is certainly the case in our data that the degree of specialisation is greater when 
children are present – the market and domestic work gaps are of the order of 24 hours a week 
amongst couples with children and only 9 hours a week amongst couples without children. 
Hence we present separate results here, although the smaller sample sizes associated with the 
sub-models mean that results must be treated with caution. 
 
One striking result from this analysis is that the sensitivity of female labour supply to intra-
household wage differences is found only amongst women with children. The point estimates   46 
of the effects are thus about twice the magnitude found when the model is estimated on the 
combined sample. Women who are capable of earning the same or more than their husband 
allocate time more equally between the domestic and market sectors than women who are 
able to earn substantially less than their husbands. The effect is not symmetrical – men whose 
earning capacity is the same or less than their wife’s do not allocate work time more equally 
than  husbands  with  an  intra-household  wage  advantage.  In  households  without  children, 
individual  time  allocation  decisions  are  not  modified  at  all  depending  on  the  earnings 
capacity of the spouse, but respond only to the absolute level of the individual’s wage.  
 
The market labour supply of men varies little with age/cohort group, regardless of whether 
children are present, the exception being the reduced market hours of childless men aged 56 
and above
22. Younger fathers allocate substantially less time to domestic work than older 
fathers, whilst amongst childless men it is only those in the oldest age/cohort group who 
significantly increase hours of domestic work. Neither market nor domestic hours of mothers 
vary substantially with age, but amongst childless women, younger cohorts allocate far more 
time to the market, partly at the expense of less time in domestic work.   
 
The correlations between the idiosyncratic errors also show marked differences according to 
the presence of children. In both cases, individual work errors are negatively correlated for 
both men and women, indicating that market and domestic work hours are substitutes. Male 
and female market labour supply errors are also positively correlated in both sub-samples, 
suggesting that spousal complementarities in market work are common to households with 
and  without  children.  We  also  find  evidence  of  spousal  complementarities  in  domestic 
production, but only amongst childless couples. Hence even when we restrict our analysis to 
families with children where gender specialisation is greatest, we find no evidence of an 
intra-household division of labour on the basis of unobserved tastes or productivities. The 
greatest contrast in the behaviour of the two types of couple is found in the correlations 
between one spouse’s market hours and the other spouse’s domestic hours. Amongst couples 
with children, both of these correlations are significantly positive. This symmetry suggests 
that if one spouse works unusually long hours in the market, they are compensated by greater 
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domestic  work  hours  on  the  part  of  their  spouse.  In  contrast,  amongst  childless  couples, 
households in which the wife supplies greater market hours than we would predict on the 
basis of her observable characteristics are characterised by lower hours of male domestic 
work. The equivalent correlation between male market work and female domestic work is not 
significantly different from zero. It is possible to interpret this result in terms of the ‘gender 
display’ perspective in which men with high-earning wives spend less time in domestic work 
in order to neutralise the challenge to traditional gender stereotypes. Alternatively, it may be 
the case that higher female earnings are used to purchase goods and services that substitute 
for male domestic production. If this interpretation is valid, it is noticeable that male earnings 
do not appear to be used to buy substitutes for female domestic work in the same way.  
 
Tables 10a and 10b present the results for the decompositions of the market and domestic 
work  gaps  in  the  two  types  of  household.  It  is  notable  that  the  gender  effect  on  time 
allocation, net of the child effect, is roughly similar in both types of household. Around 6 to 7 
hours of the market work gap in households with children is attributable neither to gender-
specific  behaviours  surrounding  children,  nor  to  gender  wage  differences,  whilst  the 
comparable figure for households without children is around 4 hours. Similarly, pure gender 
effects  account  for  around  6  to  10  hours  of  the  domestic  work  gap  in  households  with 
children  and  7  to  8  hours  in  households  without  children.  Gender  differences  in  wages, 
however,  generate differences in time allocation that are much larger in households with 
children than in those without. This is partly because wage differentials are larger between 
parents than childless individuals (see Table 1), but also because parents’ labour supplies are 
sensitive the intra-household wage differential.  The difference is particularly noticeable with 
respect to domestic labour supply, where gender wage differences generate 5 to 10 hours of 
the domestic work gap between parents, but only 2 hours or less of the gap between childless 
spouses. 
 
As  the  descriptive  statistics  in  Table  1  revealed,  households  with  children  allocate,  on 
average,  about  the  same  number  of  hours  to  the  market  in  total  as  households  without 
children, but around 20 hours more to domestic work. The greater amount of total work 
carried  out  by  parents  increases  the  gains  to  a  division  of  labour,  and  intra-household 
differences in earnings capacities play an important role the degree of specialisation that is   48 
optimal for the household. As our discussion of the underlying model parameters suggested, 
it is the allocation of women’s time that responds the most to differences in comparative 
wage advantages – households in which husband and wife have similar wage rates see a more 
equal division of female time between the market and domestic sectors. These results lead to 
the surprising conclusion that the equalisation of male and female wage rates would impact 
on the sexual division of labour more in households where children are present than when 
they are not. The incentives to allocate time efficiently in such households are greater than in 
households without children, and hence could work more strongly to counteract biological 
and cultural pressures to a sexual division of labour. Amongst households without children, 
the degree of specialisation as measured by size of the market and domestic work gaps is far 
smaller. Gender wage differences can account for a large fraction of the differences in market 
labour supplies, but cultural and biological factors are of primary importance in determining 
the residual degree of female specialisation in domestic work. 
 
5.6 Results for two-earner couples 
Much  research  into  the  time  allocation  of  couples  abstracts  from  the  labour  market 
participation decision and restricts its focus to two-earner couples
23. Whilst this may have 
advantages in terms of limiting the degree of unobserved heterogeneity in the sample and 
bypassing the need to impute wage rates for non-workers, it ignores an important dimension 
of the sexual division of labour. Single- and no-earner couples make up one third of our 
sample, although the sub-samples of the three types of household in this group (male sole-
earner,  female  sole-earner  and  no-earner)  are  too  small  to  analyse  separately.  We  do, 
however, present results for the sample of two-earner couples to see how far our conclusions 
are affected by the inclusion of non-participants in the labour market. 
 
Table  11  presents  estimates  of  the  model  parameters  for  the  sub-sample  of  two-earner 
couples. Coefficients are comparable between the market and domestic work equations here 
as there is no censoring of market labour supply. It is immediately noticeable that the hours 
of  market  work  of  both  men  and  women  are  insensitive  to  the  absolute  level  of  the 
individual’s  potential  full-time  wage  (estimates  are  of  the  expected  sign  but  small  and 
imprecisely determined). There is, however, some evidence that higher-wage women spend 
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slightly  less  time  in  domestic  work  than  lower-wage  women.  Given  the  insensitivity  of 
female market hours, this may reflect the substitution of goods purchased with their higher 
earnings for time in domestic production. A comparison of these estimates with those given 
for  the  full  sample  in  Table  3  suggests  that  variation  in  individual  wage  levels  impacts 
primarily on decision-making in households in which at least one spouse does not work in the 
market.  For  women,  this  effect  relates  primarily  to  the  decision  of  whether  or  not  to 
participate in the labour market as only 11% of the women excluded from the two-earner 
sample are workers. For men, the effect relates to both the participation decision and the 
hours of work decision as 60% of men excluded from the two-earner sample are workers. 
Estimation  on  the  sub-sample  of  two-earner  couples  with  non-missing  actual  net  wages 
(derived directly from the time use data sample) are shown in Appendix Table A5. These 
estimates are subject to the endogeneity problems relating to the non-linear nature of the tax 
system and part-time wage offers described in Section 3.2. Examination of the results does 
suggest, however, that the lack of absolute wage effects found for this group is not an artefact 
of the method used to predict wages.   
 
Our  previous  finding that the division of female work between the market and domestic 
sectors is responsive to variations in the intra-household relative wage is replicated in Table 
11  for  women  in  two-earner  couples.  As  discussed  above,  this  effect  seems  restricted  to 
women with children. The decision of whether to work part- or full-time amongst women 
with working husbands, then, seems to depend more on the level of husbands’ earnings than 
on the wife’s earnings capacity in the labour market. 
 
The number and age of children in the household remains a significant predictor of both 
female market and domestic hours even when both spouses work in the market. Again, male 
market labour supply is insensitive to the presence of children whilst male domestic labour 
supply does increase significantly, particularly when young children are present. Estimates of 
the error correlations at the bottom of Table 11 show that we find no evidence of spousal 
complementarities in either domestic or market work in the sample of two-earner couples. 
Hence  the  finding  in  other  specifications  that  spouses’  market  work  errors  are  positively 
correlated  seems  to  capture  solely  the  concentration  of  two-earner  (66%)  and  no-earner 
couples (9%) in the data.   50 
 
Results of the decomposition in the market and domestic work gaps for two-earner couples 
are given in Table 12. Note that gender specialisation is extensive even when both spouses 
work in the market, with gaps of around 12 hours per week in both sectors. The estimated 
magnitude of the wage effect is highly dependent on which behavioural equation is used as 
reference. The insensitivity of male labour supplies to both own and spouse’s wages imply 
that if all individuals behaved as men with a given set of characteristics virtually no gender 
difference in work times would remain. If all individuals behaved as women, however, men 
who have, on average, an intra-household wage advantage would supply more hours to the 
market than women and less hours to the domestic sector. When we take the female equations 
as reference, we again find that the magnitude of the wage effect is smaller in explaining the 
domestic work gap than in explaining the market work gap. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper explores the role played by gender wage differences in explaining the observed 
gender division of labour. We hypothesised that the division of labour between two spouses 
may be insensitive to their absolute and relative wage rates because biological differences 
and social norms generate an intrinsic female comparative advantage in domestic work. Our 
findings in fact point to a conclusion that is more subtle than this simple formulation allows. 
On one hand, we find evidence of large gender fixed effects that result in women performing 
far  more  domestic  work  than  men  with  similar  wage  rates  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  men 
performing more market work than women with similar wages. These gender effects are far 
stronger in households where children are present, but are substantial even net of the effect of 
children  on  behaviour.  This  suggests  that  intrinsic  differences  in  domestic  productivity 
between men and women or social norms lead spouses to specialise in a traditional manner.  
 
On the other hand, we find that for both sexes, higher earnings capacity is associated with a 
substitution away from domestic work and domestic output and towards market work and the 
goods and services that can be purchased with earned income. This finding implies that rising 
female wages will be associated with a reduction in the division of labour. The fact that 
higher-wage individuals increase market labour supply at the expense of leisure as well as 
domestic  production  means  that  higher  female  wages  would  be  associated  with  a  larger 
reduction in the market work gap than in the domestic work gap, and hence a reduction in 
overall female leisure time. 
 
This summary, however, fails to highlight the asymmetries in male and female labour supply 
behaviour. We have argued that our results are most consistent with the ‘traditional family 
model’ that effectively treats women as secondary earners. The labour supply behaviour of 
women,  or  more  specifically  of  mothers,  is  responsive  to  the  intra-household  wage 
differential  between  spouses  whilst  the  labour  supply  of  men  is  not.  This  means  that  in 
households where the earnings capacities of the spouses are relatively more equal, women 
allocate  time  more  equally  between  the  market  and  domestic  sectors  and  hence  exhibit 
patterns of time use that are more similar to those of their husbands. We find no evidence, 
however, that men’s time allocation between the two sectors is more equal when earnings   52 
capacities are more equal. This finding suggests that whilst gender specialisation would be 
reduced by increased female wages, this will come largely via the substitution of purchased 
goods and services for the domestic tasks normally carried out by women, rather than via the 
substitution of male domestic work for female domestic work. Put another way, it seems that 
female  earnings  are  used  to  buy  substitutes  for  female  domestic  work,  but  not  to  free 
husbands’ time from market work that could then be used in the domestic sector. This is the 
case even when the wife’s wage is greater than the husband’s wage, and hence suggests that 
either men’s productivity in the domestic sector is below that of market alternatives, or that 
the disutility suffered by men were they to specialise in the domestic sector is so great that it 
outweighs the income gain from the wife’s higher earnings. On balance, it seems unlikely 
that a gender-neutral model that characterises spouses simply in terms of their relative market 
and domestic productivities is sufficient to account for the degree of gender specialisation we 
observe in practice. Whilst rising female wages may lead to a reduction in the division of 
labour, a substantial gender division of labour would exist even if, on average, there were no 
gender wage differences. Fundamental differences in gender roles are important determinants 
of individual behaviour and generate pressures towards a gender division of labour, whatever 
the relative productivities (narrowly-defined) of husbands and wives.  
 
A number of other conclusions can be drawn from our supplementary analyses. Firstly, the 
relationship between an individual’s earnings capacity and their market and domestic labour 
supplies is highly non-linear. In particular, the finding that individuals with very high wage 
rates  choose  to  supply  more  domestic  labour  than  individuals  with  moderate  wage  rates 
suggests that, given sufficient income, domestic work can contain an important component of 
leisure. The assumption that domestic work is always a source of disutility, combined with 
the linear specification common to many models, appears to obscure an important facet of 
behaviour. At wage rates that are currently available to most married couples it is true that 
higher wages are associated with greater market labour supply and lower domestic labour 
supply. General increases in productivity that raise wages in the long-term, however, may 
lead to a reverse substitution away from the market and towards the domestic sector. 
 
Secondly, we find important differences in the labour supply behaviour of parents compared 
with childless couples. In childless couples, gender fixed effects are substantially larger in the   53 
domestic sector than in the market sector. A large fraction of women’s lower labour supply to 
the market sector is explained by their lower absolute wage rates, whereas the division of 
domestic labour in childless couples is largely insensitive to the spouses’ earnings capacities. 
In  contrast,  the  allocation  of  time  in  households  with  children  is  determined  much  more 
strongly by the wage differential between the spouses, and this is the case for domestic as 
well as market work. We have speculated that the greater amount of work carried out by 
parents in total creates stronger incentives to allocate time efficiently. Nevertheless, gender-
specific behaviours surrounding children are equally as important as wages differences in the 
allocation of parents’ time. 
 
Thirdly, we find markedly smaller absolute wage effects when we restrict our sample to two-
earner couples.  The only impact of gender differences in earning capacities is via the relative 
wage on female time allocation. As noted above, where the wages of the spouses are more 
equal, women divide their time more equally between the market and domestic sectors. This 
suggests that differences in the absolute earnings capacities of spouses play a particularly 
important role in the decision-making of single- and no-earner couples. Studies which focus 
exclusively  on  two-earner  couples  for  methodological  convenience  may  thus  give  a 
misleading picture of the role of wages in the labour supply decisions of men and women 
more generally. 
 
Finally, our methodology produces estimates of the correlations between the idiosyncratic 
components of spouses’ market  and domestic labour supplies. We find no evidence of a 
division  of  labour  on  the  basis  of  unobserved  tastes  or  productivities,  in  the  sense  that 
unusually high hours of work by one spouse in a given sector are not associated with lower 
hours of work by the other spouse. Instead, we find evidence of spousal complementarities in 
market labour supply that appear to be driven by the prevalence of two-earner and no-earner 
couples.  We  do,  however,  find  correlations  that  point  to  intra-household  trade  amongst 
parents. Individuals who allocate more hours to the labour market than we would predict on 
the basis of their observed characteristics tend to have spouses who allocate more time to 
domestic work, and this is the case whether it is the husband or wife who works longer in the 
labour market. In contrast, the excess labour supply of childless women is associated with 
less domestic work on the part of their husbands, perhaps because female earnings are spent   54 
differentially from male earnings on substitutes for domestic production. 
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Figure 1. The gender division of labour in 12 developed countries 
 




























































Sources: Eurostat (2003), Table 1; US Dept. of Labor (2005), Table 1; Australian Bureau of Statistics (1998), 
Table 1; Commission of the European Communities (2003), Table 1. 
Year of collection of time use data varies from 1997 (Australia) to 2004 (USA). Time use surveys were not fully 
comparable across all countries. Gender pay ratios are for the year 2000.   60 
Figure 2. Estimated relationships between absolute wage and hours of work 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for variables used in analysis 
 
Figures are means over the relevant sample  
 






                 
  Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Females  Males  Females 
                 
N   1170   633  537  768 
(% total sample)  (100%)  (54%)  (46%)  (66%) 
                 
Market work 
(Weekly hours)  43.9  26.1  46.8  22.1  40.5  30.8  49.9  37.6 
Market work 
(Participation rate)  0.88  0.70  0.91  0.64  0.82  0.76  -  - 
                 
Market work gap  17.8  24.7  9.7  12.3 
                 
Domestic work 
(Weekly hours)  17.9  34.6  18.7  41.8  16.9  26.0  16.2  28.7 
Domestic work 
(Participation rate)  0.97  1.00  0.97  1.00  0.97  0.99  0.97  1.00 
                 
Domestic work gap  16.7  23.1  9.1  12.5 
                 
Predicted absolute wage 
(£ per hour)  8.99  6.40  9.28  6.18  8.66  6.65  9.47  6.97 
Predicted relative  
wage  1.49  0.77  1.58  0.72  1.39  0.83  1.45  0.79 
                 
Proportion aged:                 
18-25  0.05  0.09  0.04  0.08  0.06  0.10  0.04  0.08 
26-35  0.29  0.35  0.34  0.45  0.24  0.23  0.32  0.37 
36-45  0.32  0.28  0.45  0.39  0.16  0.14  0.33  0.29 
46 to 55  0.20  0.20  0.14  0.07  0.26  0.36  0.21  0.21 
56+  0.14  0.08  0.02  0.00  0.29  0.18  0.10  0.05 
                 
Number of children aged:               
0-2  0.18  0.33  -  0.12 
3-4  0.13  0.24  -  0.09 
5-9  0.36  0.66  -  0.32 
10-15  0.38  0.70  -  0.39   62 
Table 2. Model selection using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
 
Absolute wage variable  Relative wage variable  AIC 
level, squared   ln  36013.5 
level, squared   level  36020.6 
ln  ln  36021.4 
level, squared   level, squared  36023.7 
ln  level  36028.4 
ln  level, squared  36030.1 




) 1 ( 2 ) ln( 2 + + - = p L AIC  where L is the likelihood and p is the number of elements in the 
parameter vector. The lower the AIC, the better the model. 
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Table 3. Model estimates, full sample 
 
(Absolute z-statistics in brackets) 
 
  Market work (weekly hours)    Domestic work (weekly hours) 
  Males  Females    Males  Females 
                   
Absolute wage  9.29  ***  12.83  ***    -2.07  ***  -2.59  *** 
  (8.59)    (8.07)      (3.60)    (2.81)   
(Absolute wage)
2  -0.34  ***  -0.58  ***    0.08  ***  0.11  ** 
  (7.14)    (6.02)      (3.29)    (1.99)   
Ln(relative wage)  -0.59     4.75  *    -1.82     -6.23  *** 
  (0.24)    (1.96)      (1.42)    (4.52)   
                   
# Children age 0-2  -0.79     -18.24  ***    6.47  ***  17.48  *** 
  (0.43)    (8.75)      (6.70)    (15.53)   
# Children age 3-4  1.87     -12.59  ***    0.04     10.25  *** 
  (0.87)    (5.27)      (0.04)    (7.77)   
# Children age 5-9  -0.59     -6.90  ***    1.84  ***  7.21  *** 
  (0.48)    (5.19)      (2.84)    (9.58)   
# Children age 10-15  -1.12     -0.20       0.36     2.78  *** 
  (0.99)    (0.17)      (0.60)    (3.91)   
                   
Age 18-25  5.69     5.49  *    -5.38  ***  -3.63  * 
  (1.55)    (1.66)      (2.71)    (1.92)   
Age 26-35  1.38     5.77  ***    -2.38  **  -3.68  *** 
  (0.70)    (2.80)      (2.25)    (3.08)   
Age 46-55  -2.56     3.12       1.83     2.81  * 
  (1.19)    (1.27)      (1.58)    (1.96)   
Age 56+  -20.27  ***  -11.28  ***    6.11  ***  3.59  * 
  (7.63)    (3.24)      (4.39)    (1.80)   
                   
Constant  41.32  ***  32.19  ***    17.00  ***  24.41  *** 
  (21.87)    (15.60)      (16.87)    (20.47)   
                   
2
,m L s ,  2
, f L s ,  2
,m H s ,  2
, f H s  
602.24  ***  648.05  *** 
 
169.46  ***  228.16  *** 
  (21.31)    (19.17)      (24.19)    (24.18)   
 Implied standard errors  24.54    25.46      13.02    15.11   
m H m L , , , s , 
f H f L , , , s  
-177.51  ***  -236.86  *** 
         
  (15.88)    (16.68)             
Implied correlation coefficients  -0.56    -0.62             
f L m L , , , s , 
f H m H , , , s  
109.33  ***  5.84    
         
  (5.37)    (1.01)             
Implied correlation coefficients  0.18    0.03             
f H m L , , , s , 
m H f L , , , s  
18.17     4.33    
         
  (1.64)    (0.42)             
Implied correlation coefficients  0.05    0.01             
                   
Log Likelihood  -17947.742               
N  1170                 
 
Notes 
Absolute wage variables are mean-centred around the mean for the sample of men and women as a whole (£7.70 
p.h.). Omitted age group is 36-45. Hence the constant has the interpretation of the mean hours of work for a 
childless individual age 36-35, with a wage of £7.70 p.h. and a relative wage of 1 (i.e. equal wage to spouse). 
Marginal effects in the market work equations relate to the latent variable L* and so are not directly comparable 
with marginal effects in the domestic work equations. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively   64 
Table 4: Decomposition of market and domestic work gaps, full sample, N = 1170 
 
Figures are percentage of total gap (figures in brackets are weekly hours of work) 
 
    Market work    Domestic work 








                     
Wage effect    42  (7.5)  43  (7.7)    16  (2.7)  34  (5.7) 
Of which:                     
Absolute wage    44  (7.9)  29  (5.2)    9  (1.5)  9  (1.5) 
Relative wage    -2  (-0.4)  14  (2.5)    7  (1.2)  25  (4.1) 
                     
Gender effect    58  (10.2)  57  (10.0)    84  (14.0)  66  (11.0) 
Of which:                     
Responses to children    31  (5.5)  33  (5.9)    37  (6.1)  37  (6.1) 
Of which:                     
Age 0-2    14  (2.4)  15  (2.7)    12  (1.9)  12  (1.9) 
Age 3-4    8  (1.5)  9  (1.6)    8  (1.3)  8  (1.3) 
Age 5-9    10  (1.8)  11  (2.0)    12  (1.9)  12  (1.9) 
Age 10-15    -2  (-0.3)  -2  (-0.3)    6  (0.9)  6  (0.9) 
                     
Total    100  (17.7)  100  (17.7)    100  (16.7)  100  (16.7) 
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Table 5. Robustness of estimates to definitions of market and domestic work, full sample, N 
= 1170 
 
Figures are percentage of total gap (figures in brackets are weekly hours of work) 
 
    Market work    Domestic work 








Preferred specification                     
Wage effect    42  (7.5)  43  (7.7)    16  (2.7)  34  (5.7) 
Of which:                     
Absolute wage    44  (7.9)  29  (5.2)    9  (1.5)  9  (1.5) 
Relative wage    -2  (-0.4)  14  (2.5)    7  (1.2)  25  (4.1) 
                     
Gender effect    58  (10.2)  57  (10.0)    84  (14.0)  66  (11.0) 
Of which:                     
Responses to children    31  (5.5)  33  (5.9)    37  (6.1)  37  (6.1) 
                     
Total    100  (17.7)  100  (17.7)    100  (16.7)  100  (16.7) 
Excluding travel time                     
Wage effect    43  (6.7)  44  (6.0)    18  (2.6)  33  (4.9) 
Of which:                     
Absolute wage    44  (6.9)  29  (4.6)    8  (1.3)  9  (1.4) 
Relative wage    -1  (-0.2)  15  (2.4)    9  (1.4)  23  (3.5) 
                     
Gender effect    57  (9.0)  56  (8.7)    82  (12.4)  67  (10.1) 
Of which:                     
Responses to children    29  (4.5)  31  (4.9)    34  (5.1)  34  (5.1) 
                     
Total    100  (15.7)  100  (15.7)    100  (15.1)  100  (15.1) 
Including secondary time 
use 
                   
Wage effect    42  (7.2)  46  (8.3)    12  (2.4)  36  (7.4) 
Of which:                     
Absolute wage    45  (8.1)  29  (5.3)    5  (1.0)  5  (1.0) 
Relative wage    -3  (-0.5)  17  (3.1)    7  (1.5)  31  (6.4) 
                     
Gender effect    58  (10.6)  54  (9.8)    88  (18.3)  64  (13.3) 
Of which:                     
Responses to children    31  (5.7)  34  (6.2)    41  (8.5)  41  (8.5) 
                     
Total    100  (18.1)  100  (18.1)    100  (20.7)  100  (20.7) 
Correcting for outliers                     
Wage effect    43  (7.3)  43  (7.3)    17  (2.7)  34  (5.3) 
Of which:                     
Absolute wage    47  (7.9)  31  (5.2)    9  (1.5)  10  (1.6) 
Relative wage    -3  (-0.6)  12  (2.1)    8  (1.2)  23  (3.7) 
                     
Gender effect    57  (9.6)  57  (9.6)    83  (13.3)  66  (10.6) 
Of which:                     
Responses to children    31  (5.2)  33  (5.6)    34  (5.4)  34  (5.4) 
                     
Total    100  (16.9)  100  (16.9)    100  (16.0)  100  (16.0) 
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Table 6. Robustness of estimates to method used to predict wages, full sample, N = 1170 
 
Figures are percentage of total gap (figures in brackets are weekly hours of work) 
 
    Market work    Domestic work 








Split sample, 25 percentile*                     
Wage effect    42  (7.5)  43  (7.7)    16  (2.7)  34  (5.7) 
Of which:                     
Absolute wage    44  (7.9)  29  (5.2)    9  (1.5)  9  (1.5) 
Relative wage    -2  (-0.4)  14  (2.5)    7  (1.2)  25  (4.1) 
                     
Gender effect    58  (10.2)  57  (10.0)    84  (14.0)  66  (11.0) 
Of which:                     
Responses to children    31  (5.5)  33  (5.9)    37  (6.1)  37  (6.1) 
                     
Total    100  (17.7)  100  (17.7)    100  (16.7)  100  (16.7) 
Controls for imputed job 
tenure 
                   
Wage effect    17  (3.0)  36  (6.4)    10  (1.6)  22  (3.6) 
Of which:                     
Absolute wage    30  (5.3)  20  (3.6)    4  (0.7)  5  (0.8) 
Relative wage    -13  (-2.3)  16  (2.8)    6  (0.9)  17  (2.8) 
                     
Gender effect    83  (14.7)  64  (11.3)    90  (15.1)  78  (13.1) 
Of which:                     
Responses to children    36  (6.3)  37  (6.6)    39  (6.6)  39  (6.6) 
                     
Total    100  (17.7)  100  (17.7)    100  (16.7)  100  (16.7) 
Heckman-corrected                     
Wage effect    27  (4.8)  2  (0.4)    8  (1.4)  7  (1.2) 
Of which:                     
Absolute wage    16  (2.9)  7  (1.3)    1  (0.2)  3  (0.4) 
Relative wage    11  (1.9)  -5  (-0.9)    7  (1.2)  5  (0.8) 
                     
Gender effect    73  (13.0)  98  (7.4)    92  (15.2)  93  (15.5) 
Of which:                     
Responses to children    42  7.5  44  7.8    43  (7.2)  43  (7.2) 
                     
Total    100  (17.7)  100  (17.7)    100  (16.7)  100  (16.7) 
Split sample, new entrant 
wages 
                   
Wage effect    32  (5.7)  34  (6.0)    13  (2.1)  24  (4.1) 
Of which:                     
Absolute wage    36  (6.4)  24  (4.2)    6  (0.9)  6  (1.0) 
Relative wage    -4  (-0.7)  10  (1.8)    7  (1.2)  18  (3.0) 
                     
Gender effect    68  (12.0)  66  (11.7)    87  (14.6)  76  (12.6) 
Of which:                     
Responses to children    36  (6.3)  38  (6.7)    47  (7.8)  47  (7.8) 
                     
Total    100  (17.7)  100  (17.7)    100  (16.7)  100  (16.7) 
Split sample, 10 percentile                     
Wage effect    72  (12.8)  58  (7.3)    25  (4.2)  48  (7.9) 
Of which:                     
Absolute wage    67  (11.9)  47  (8.4)    16  (2.7)  17  (2.8) 
Relative wage    5  (1.0)  11  (1.9)    9  (1.6)  31  (5.1) 
                     
Gender effect    28  (4.9)  42  (7.4)    75  (12.5)  52  (8.8) 
Of which:                     
Responses to children    21  (3.7)  25  (4.4)    31  (5.2)  31  (5.2) 
                     
Total    100  (17.7)  100  (17.7)    100  (16.7)  100  (16.7) 
 
(Continued overleaf)   67 
Notes 
 
  Method used to predict gross full-time wages for: 
  Full-time workers  Part-time workers and non-
participants 
Split sample, 25 percentile 
(preferred specification) 
Conditional mean of sample of 
full-time workers 
Conditional 25
th percentile of 
sample of full-time workers 
Controls for imputed job 
tenure 
Conditional mean of sample of 
full-time workers, controls for 
work experience, work 
experience imputed from sample 
of full-time workers 
Conditional mean of sample of 
full-time workers, controls for 
work experience, work 
experience imputed from sample 
of part-time workers for part-
timers, zero for non-participants 
Heckman-corrected 
Heckman-corrected conditional 
mean of sample of full-time 
workers, number and age of 
children used for identification 
Heckman-corrected conditional 
mean of sample of full-time 
workers, number and age of 
children used for identification 
Split sample, new entrant 
wages 
Conditional mean of sample of 
full-time workers 
Conditional mean of sample of 
full-time workers in current job 
for less than 6 months 
Split sample, 10 percentile  Conditional mean of sample of 
full-time workers 
Conditional 10
th percentile of 
sample of full-time workers 
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Mean wage gap  2.60  2.12  1.54  2.32  3.03 
Male wages         
Mean  8.99  8.88  8.97  9.06  8.73 
S.D.  3.54  3.33  3.67  3.52  3.71 
p10  5.18  5.45  4.82  5.37  4.40 
p90  14.21  13.91  14.51  14.38  14.21 
Female wages         
Mean  6.40  6.76  7.43  6.74  5.70 
S.D.  2.45  2.43  2.56  2.53  2.51 
p10  3.93  4.31  4.94  4.13  3.29 
p90  9.99  10.44  11.29  10.39  9.21 
           
Male/female relative wages          
Mean  1.49  1.38  1.25  1.42  1.68 
S.D.  0.58  0.47  0.45  0.53  0.76 
p10  0.89  0.89  0.72  0.88  0.87 
p90  2.24  1.98  1.82  2.09  2.65   69 
Table 8. The effect of including additional controls on model estimates 
 
Coefficients in bold relate to the preferred parsimonious specification shown in Table 2.3 
 
  Market work  Domestic work 
  Males  Females  Males  Females 
Absolute wage  8.59 ***  9.29***  13.78***  12.83***  -2.89***  -2.07***  -2.63**  -2.59*** 
(Absolute wage)
2  -0.23 ***  -0.34***  -0.48***  -0.58***  0.09***  0.08***  0.07   0.11** 
Ln(relative wage)  6.99 **  -0.59   8.52**  4.75*  -2.22   -1.82   -9.55***  -6.23*** 
# Children age 0-2  -2.80    -0.79   -17.97***  -18.24***  7.01***  6.47***  17.45***  17.48*** 
# Children age 3-4  0.42    1.87   -12.27***  -12.59***  0.54   0.04   10.38***  10.25*** 
# Children age 5-9  -1.93 *  -0.59   -5.87***  -6.90***  2.22***  1.84***  6.79***  7.21*** 
# Children age 10-15  -1.83 *  -1.12   1.64   -0.20   0.45   0.36   2.16***  2.78*** 
Age 18-25  11.46 ***  5.69   13.29***  5.49*  -6.55***  -5.38***  -4.49**  -3.63* 
Age 26-35  3.61 *  1.38   8.44***  5.77***  -2.98***  -2.38**  -3.92***  -3.68*** 
Age 46-55  -0.66    -2.56   -0.68   -3.12   1.15   1.83   1.84   2.81* 
Age 56+  -12.85 ***  -20.27***  -6.81*  -11.28***  3.24**  6.11***  1.09   3.59* 
Degree  -23.79 ***    -25.68***    8.29***    5.85**   
A-level  -7.53 ***      -11.55***    4.20***      -0.16      
Education missing  10.33        -16.41     3.55       4.84      
Higher education than 
spouse  -7.42 ***   
  -1.99     0.60       4.09**     
Lower education than 
spouse  3.35     
  0.90     -0.01       -2.80**     
Relative education missing  -3.88        -1.74     -4.44       -0.36      
Age difference from spouse  -0.18        0.18     0.13       0.07      
Long-term health problem  -12.40 ***      -3.84**    2.08**      -0.38      
Spouse has long-term health 
problem  -0.34     
  -0.27     0.51       -0.41      
Owns home outright  -6.00 ***      -5.84**    2.34*      4.89***     
Rents housing  -4.47 **      -13.63***    -0.61       1.86      
Any income from interest or 
rent  0.56     
  -2.22     -0.43       0.65      
Use of car  8.56 ***      1.65     1.09       3.68**     
Constant  41.06 ***  41.32***  44.25***  32.19***  13.80***  17.00***  18.17***  24.41*** 
                  
Log likelihood  -17753.982  -17947.742             




Absolute wage variables are mean-centred around the mean for the sample of men and women as a whole (£7.70 
p.h.). Omitted age group is 36-45. Hence the constant in the parsimonious specifications has the interpretation of 
the mean hours of work for a childless individual age 36-35, with a wage of £7.70 p.h. and a relative wage of 1 
(i.e. equal wage to spouse). In the equations with full controls, the omitted groups are: Education = GCSE/none; 
Individual has same education level as spouse; Housing tenure is mortgaged. Hence the constant relates to 
individuals with these additional characteristics, who also are the same age as their spouse; who neither suffer 
from  a  long-term  health  problem  nor  have  a  spouse  with  a  long-term  health  problem;  and  who  live  in 
households that do not receive income from interest or rent and do not have the use of a car. 
Marginal effects in the market work equations relate to the latent variable L* and so are not directly comparable 
with marginal effects in the domestic work equations. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively    70 
Table 9a.Model estimates, sample of households with children 
 
(Absolute z-statistics in brackets) 
 
  Market work (weekly hours)    Domestic work (weekly hours) 
  Males  Females    Males  Females 
                   
Absolute wage  9.01  ***  12.70  ***    -2.68  ***  -2.35  * 
  (6.48)    (5.26)      (3.36)    (1.65)   
(Absolute wage)
2  -0.33  ***  -0.59  ***    0.11  ***  0.11    
  (5.63)    (3.98)      (3.20)    (1.19)   
Ln(relative wage)  1.56     8.97  ***    -3.41  *  -9.94  *** 
  (0.48)    (2.60)      (1.83)    (4.99)   
                   
# Children age 0-2  -3.56  *  -18.63  ***    5.79  ***  13.87  *** 
  (1.66)    (7.01)      (4.80)    (9.64)   
# Children age 3-4  0.04     -12.92  ***    -0.59     7.71  *** 
  (0.02)    (4.77)      (0.47)    (5.09)   
# Children age 5-9  -2.50  *  -7.76  ***    1.22     5.23  *** 
  (1.75)    (4.60)      (1.50)    (5.44)   
# Children age 10-15  -3.53  **  -1.31       -0.61     0.61    
  (2.42)    (0.76)      (0.73)    (0.60)   
                   
Age 18-25  7.48     -3.44       -7.57  **  0.95    
  (1.46)    (0.65)      (2.56)    (0.32)   
Age 26-35  0.23     4.57  *    -3.30  **  -2.33    
  (0.10)    (1.75)      (2.43)    (1.51)   
Age 46+  -3.89    -1.45       4.16  ***  2.93    
  (1.43)    (0.34)      (2.65)    (1.14)   
                   
Constant  45.99  ***  35.49  ***    19.78  ***  27.73  *** 
  (15.32)    (9.74)      (11.53)    (13.12)   
                   
2
,m L s ,  2
, f L s ,  2
,m H s ,  2
, f H s  
530.58  ***  681.04  *** 
 
176.19  ***  251.24  *** 
  (16.25)    (13.73)      (17.79)    (17.79)   
 Implied standard errors  23.03    26.10      13.27    15.85   
m H m L , , , s , 
f H f L , , , s  
-179.35  ***  -269.55  *** 
         
  (12.36)    (12.72)             
Implied correlation coefficients  0.59    0.65             
f L m L , , , s , 
f H m H , , , s  
54.97  **  -12.91    
         
  (2.10)    (1.53)             
Implied correlation coefficients  0.09    -0.06             
f H m L , , , s , 
m H f L , , , s  
33.34  **  37.65  ** 
         
  (2.26)    (2.57)             
Implied correlation coefficients  0.09    0.11             
                   
Log Likelihood  -9653.4997               
N  633                 
 
Notes 
Absolute wage variables are mean-centred around the mean for the sample of men and women as a whole (£7.73 
p.h.). Omitted age group is 36-45. Hence the constant has the interpretation of the mean hours of work for a 
childless individual age 36-35, with a wage of £7.73 p.h. and a relative wage of 1 (i.e. equal wage to spouse). 
Marginal effects in the market work equations relate to the latent variable L* and so are not directly comparable 
with marginal effects in the domestic work equations. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively   71 
Table 9b. Model estimates, sample of households without children 
 
(Absolute z-statistics in brackets) 
 
  Market work (weekly hours)    Domestic work (weekly hours) 
  Males  Females    Males  Females 
                   
Absolute wage  9.80  ***  12.21  ***    -1.64  *  -2.58  ** 
  (5.43)    (5.73)      (1.92)    (2.20)   
(Absolute wage)
2  -0.35  ***  -0.53  ***    0.06     0.11    
  (4.27)    (4.22)      (1.53)    (1.61)   
Ln(relative wage)  -3.00     0.57       0.61     -1.86    
  (0.79)    (0.17)      (0.34)    (1.01)   
                   
Age 18-25  4.06     12.53  ***    -4.16     -8.01  *** 
  (0.73)    (2.85)      (1.54)    (3.29)   
Age 26-35  2.89     6.80  *    -1.47     -6.38  *** 
  (0.79)    (1.91)      (0.82)    (3.21)   
Age 46-55  -2.71     -2.47       1.49     2.57    
  (0.76)    (0.73)      (0.86)    (1.37)   
Age 56+  -18.26  ***  -9.96  **    5.71  ***  3.57    
  (4.89)    (2.48)      (3.22)    (1.65)   
                   
Constant  39.71  ***  30.25  ***    15.87  ***  25.60  *** 
  (12.92)    (10.27)      (10.74)    (15.88)   
                   
2
,m L s ,  2
, f L s ,  2
,m H s ,  2
, f H s  
705.11  ***  600.01  *** 
 
160.01  ***  186.63  *** 
  (13.77)    (13.42)      (16.38)    (16.38)   
 Implied standard errors  26.55    24.50      12.65    13.66   
m H m L , , , s , 
f H f L , , , s  
-182.13  ***  -191.42  *** 
         
  (10.32)    (10.79)             
Implied correlation coefficients  -0.54    -0.57             
f L m L , , , s , 
f H m H , , , s  
179.98  ***  29.25  *** 
         
  (5.49)    (3.85)             
Implied correlation coefficients  0.28    0.17             
f H m L , , , s , 
m H f L , , , s  
-8.31     -39.43  *** 
         
  (0.51)    (2.73)             
Implied correlation coefficients  -0.02    -0.13             
                 
Log Likelihood  -8237.7655               
N  537                 
 
Notes 
Absolute wage variables are mean-centred around the mean for the sample of men and women as a whole (£7.65 
p.h.). Omitted age group is 36-45. Hence the constant has the interpretation of the mean hours of work for a 
childless individual age 36-35, with a wage of £7.65 p.h. and a relative wage of 1 (i.e. equal wage to spouse). 
 
Marginal effects in the market work equations relate to the latent variable L* and so are not directly comparable 
with marginal effects in the domestic work equations. 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively   72 
Table 10a. Decomposition of market and domestic work gaps, sample of households with 
children, N = 633 
 
Figures are percentage of total gap (figures in brackets are weekly hours of work) 
 
    Market work    Domestic work 








                     
Wage effect    41  (10.1)  41  (10.1)    21  (4.9)  40  (9.2) 
Of which:                     
Absolute wage    36  (8.9)  19  (4.7)    10  (2.2)  6  (1.4) 
Relative wage    5  (1.2)  22  (5.5)    12  (2.7)  34  (7.8) 
                     
Gender effect    59  (14.7)  59  (14.6)    79  (18.2)  60  (13.9) 
Of which:                     
Responses to children    30  (7.4)  34  (8.4)    35  (8.1)  35  (8.1) 
Of which:                     
Age 0-2    15  (3.7)  17  (4.1)    11  (2.6)  11  (2.6) 
Age 3-4    9  (2.3)  11  (2.6)    9  (2.0)  9  (2.0) 
Age 5-9    11  (2.6)  12  (2.9)    11  (2.7)  11  (2.7) 
Age 10-15    -5  (-1.2)  -5  (-1.3)    4  (0.9)  4  (0.9) 
                     
Total    100  (24.7)  100  (24.7)    100  (23.1)  100  (23.1) 
 
Table 10b. Decomposition of market and domestic work gaps, sample of households without 
children, N = 537 
 
Figures are percentage of total gap (figures in brackets are weekly hours of work) 
 
    Market work    Domestic work 








                     
Wage effect    54  (5.1)  56  (5.2)    9  (0.8)  24  (2.2) 
Of which:                     
Absolute wage    69  (6.4)  53  (5.0)    13  (1.1)  14  (1.3) 
Relative wage    -15  (-1.4)  3  (0.3)    -3  (-0.3)  11  (1.0) 
                     
Gender effect    46  (4.3)  44  (4.1)    91  (8.3)  76  (6.9) 
                     
Total    100  (9.4)  100  (9.4)    100  (9.1)  100  (9.1) 
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Table 11. Model estimates, sample of two-earner couples 
 
(Absolute z-statistics in brackets) 
 
  Market work (weekly hours)    Domestic work (weekly hours) 
  Males  Females    Males  Females 
                   
Absolute wage  1.42     1.25       -0.49     -1.94  ** 
  (1.40)    (1.02)      (0.70)    (2.00)   
(Absolute wage)
2  -0.05     -0.02       0.02     0.09    
  (1.24)    (0.35)      (0.70)    (1.54)   
Ln(relative wage)  -0.99     7.35  ***    -0.39     -4.23  *** 
  (0.49)    (3.93)      (0.29)    (2.84)   
                   
# Children age 0-2  0.45     -8.05  ***    7.31  ***  14.14  *** 
  (0.25)    (4.68)      (5.95)    (10.33)   
# Children age 3-4  0.29     -3.57  *    1.33     7.31  *** 
  (0.14)    (1.84)      (0.96)    (4.74)   
# Children age 5-9  -0.31     -4.51  ***    2.24  ***  7.30  *** 
  (0.28)    (4.39)      (3.02)    (8.95)   
# Children age 10-15  0.20     -1.17       0.09     3.48  *** 
  (0.21)    (1.29)      (0.14)    (4.83)   
                   
Age 18-25  -5.55  *  4.20  *    -2.01     -4.33  ** 
  (1.72)    (1.70)      (0.91)    (2.20)   
Age 26-35  0.00     1.46       -2.78  **  -2.23  * 
  (0.00)    (0.96)      (2.52)    (1.85)   
Age 46-55  -0.74     -3.31  *    0.84     4.28  *** 
  (0.42)    (1.82)      (0.69)    (2.96)   
Age 56+  -5.81  **  -3.93       2.09     4.18  * 
  (2.46)    (1.31)      (1.29)    (1.75)   
                   
Constant  50.64  ***  44.09  ***    15.23  ***  20.98  *** 
  (33.25)    (29.57)      (14.64)    (17.73)   
                   
2
,m L s ,  2
, f L s ,  2
,m H s ,  2
, f H s  
278.70  ***  249.58  *** 
 
129.45  ***  158.12  *** 
  (19.59)    (19.60)      (19.59)    (19.59)   
Implied standard errors  16.69    15.80      11.38    12.57   
m H m L , , , s , 
f H f L , , , s  
-102.27  ***  -121.00  *** 
         
  -13.14    -14.42             
Implied correlation coefficients  -0.54    -0.61             
f L m L , , , s , 
f H m H , , , s  
7.68     5.66    
         
  0.80    1.09             
Implied correlation coefficients  0.03    0.04             
f H m L , , , s , 
m H f L , , , s  
19.54  **  11.56  * 
         
  2.56    1.78             
Implied correlation coefficients  0.06    0.09             
                   
Log Likelihood  -12114.093               
N  768                 
 
Notes 
Absolute wage variables are mean-centred around the mean for the sample of men and women as a whole (£8.22 
p.h.). Omitted age group is 36-45. Hence the constant has the interpretation of the mean hours of work for a 
childless individual age 36-35, with a wage of £8.22 p.h. and a relative wage of 1 (i.e. equal wage to spouse). 
Marginal effects in the market work equations relate to the latent variable L* and so are not directly comparable 
with marginal effects in the domestic work equations. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively   74 
Table 12. Decomposition of market and domestic work gaps, sample of two-earner couples, 
N = 768 
 
Figures are percentage of total gap (figures in brackets are weekly hours of work) 
 
    Market work    Domestic work 








                     
Wage effect    4  (0.4)  53  (6.5)    4  (0.5)  27  (3.4) 
Of which:                     
Absolute wage    8  (1.0)  16  (2.0)    2  (0.3)  7  (0.9) 
Relative wage    -5  (-0.6)  36  (4.5)    2  (0.2)  21  (2.6) 
                     
Gender effect    96  (11.9)  47  (5.8)    96  (12.1)  73  (9.1) 
Of which:                     
Responses to children    27  (3.3)  27  (3.3)    34  (4.3)  34  (4.3) 
Of which:                     
Age 0-2    9  (1.1)  9  (1.1)    7  (0.8)  7  (0.8) 
Age 3-4    3  (0.4)  3  (0.4)    4  (0.6)  4  (0.6) 
Age 5-9    11  (1.3)  11  (1.3)    13  (1.6)  13  (1.6) 
Age 10-15    4  (0.5)  4  (0.5)    10  (1.3)  10  (1.3) 
                     
Total    100  (12.3)  100  (12.3)    100  (12.5)  100  (12.5) 
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Appendix A: Supplementary tables  
 
Appendix Table A1: Sample selection criteria 
 
(Percentage of total sample in parentheses) 
         
Total sample of households  6414  (100%)     
Excluded observations due to:         
No married/cohabiting couples (both aged 18 or more) in 
household      2494  (39%) 
2 or more married/cohabiting couples (both aged 18 or more) in 
household      21  (0%) 
Remaining  3899  (61%)     
Excluded observations due to:         
Other persons aged 16 or more in household (in addition to 
couple)      921  (14%) 
Remaining  2978  (46%)     
Excluded observations due to:         
Head or spouse full-time student      17  (0%) 
Head or spouse is over retirement age
24      756  (12%) 
Remaining  2207  (34%)     
Excluded observations due to:         
Both questionnaire and diary data missing on head or spouse
25      412  (6%) 
Questionnaire data only missing on head or spouse      213  (3%) 
Diary data only missing on head or spouse      91  (1%) 
Remaining  1491  (23%)     
Excluded observations due to:         
Head or spouse is in employment or self-employment but reports 
zero hours of paid work on both diary days      321  (5%) 
Remaining  1170  (18%)     
 
                                                 
24 Men aged 65 or more and women aged 60 or more are classified as over retirement age. 
25 Diary data is considered missing if the individual completed less than two 24-hour time diaries. Questionnaire 
data is missing if the individual did not return any part of the individual questionnaire.    76 
Appendix Table A2: QLFS wage equations used to predict wages for the UKTUS sample 
 
Dependent variable is log of gross hourly wage. 
Estimation sample is married/cohabiting individuals in (self-defined) full-time work. 
 
  Males    Females 
  OLS    25 percentile    OLS    25 percentile 
N  29 187    15 669 
Adj. R
2/Pseudo- R
2  0.3292     0.1910     0.3682     0.2218  
                       
Highest qualification (base = none)                       
Higher degree  0.85 ***    0.85 ***    0.86 ***   0.87 *** 
NVQ Level 5  0.46 ***    0.43 ***    0.68 ***   0.63 *** 
First degree  0.76 ***    0.74 ***    0.77 ***   0.75 *** 
Other degree  0.81 ***    0.81 ***    0.91 ***   0.90 *** 
NVQ Level 4  0.51 ***    0.49 ***    0.47 ***   0.52 *** 
Diploma in Higher Education  0.50 ***    0.41 ***    0.62 ***   0.64 *** 
HNC, HND, BTEC, etc Higher  0.56 ***    0.57 ***    0.49 ***   0.46 *** 
Teaching, Further  0.33 ***    0.35 ***    0.48 ***   0.49 *** 
Teaching, Secondary  0.70 ***    0.73 ***    0.81 ***   0.75 *** 
Teaching, Primary  0.70 ***    0.86 ***    0.84 ***   0.90 *** 
Teaching, Level not specified  0.37 **    0.16      0.34 **    0.29   
Nursing etc  0.51 ***    0.57 ***    0.54 ***   0.59 *** 
RSA Higher Diploma  0.45 *    0.41      0.41 ***   0.37 *** 
Other Higher Education below degree  0.49 ***    0.44 ***    0.44 ***   0.41 *** 
NVQ Level 3  0.27 ***    0.27 ***    0.27 ***   0.30 *** 
GNVQ Advanced  0.34 ***    0.31 ***    0.29 ***   0.28 *** 
A-level or equivalent  0.55 ***    0.47 ***    0.46 ***   0.42 *** 
RSA Advanced Diploma  0.25      0.34 *    0.32 ***   0.31 *** 
OND, ONC, BTEC etc National  0.45 ***    0.45 ***    0.37 ***   0.36 *** 
City and Guilds Advanced Craft  0.26 ***    0.26 ***    0.14 ***   0.13 *** 
Scottish CSYS  0.54 ***    0.43 *    0.36 ***   0.22   
SCE Higher or equivalent  0.46 ***    0.42 ***    0.40 ***   0.39 *** 
AS Level or equivalent  0.30 *    0.29 **    0.36 ***   0.39 *** 
Trade apprenticeship  0.21 ***    0.20 ***    0.08 ***   0.11 *** 
NVQ Level 2 or equivalent  0.07 ***    0.08 ***    0.08 ***   0.10 *** 
GNVQ Intermediate  0.17 *    0.16      0.29 ***   0.23 *** 
RSA Diploma  0.36 ***    0.29 *    0.35 ***   0.32 *** 
City and Guilds Craft  0.16 ***    0.18 ***    0.23 ***   0.20 *** 
BTEC, SCOTVEC 1st/General Diploma  0.32 ***    0.38 ***    0.15 **    0.19 *** 
O Level, GCSE A-C or equivalent  0.30 ***    0.24 ***    0.28 ***   0.27 *** 
NVQ Level 1 or equivalent  0.06      0.09 *    -0.02      0.01   
GNVQ, GSVQ Foundation Level  0.17      0.05      0.27      0.36   
CSE < Grade 1, GCSE < C  0.10 ***    0.11 ***    0.08 ***   0.09 *** 
BTEC, SCOTVEC 1st/General Certificate  -0.04      0.09      0.18      0.35 *** 
SCOTVEC modules  -0.18      -0.27 **    0.09      0.04   
RSA other  0.15 **    0.12 *    0.15 ***   0.18 *** 
City and Guilds other  0.04      0.10 **    0.06      0.08   
YT, YTP Certificate  0.11      0.08 *    -0.05      -0.03     77 
Other qualification  0.09 ***    0.06 ***    0.17 ***   0.10 *** 
Don't know  0.20 ***    0.09 **    0.18 ***   0.24 *** 
Age  0.08 ***    0.07 ***    0.06 ***   0.05 *** 
Age squared  -0.08 ***    -0.07 ***    -0.07 ***   -0.06 *** 
Health problem lasting > 1 year  -0.01      -0.01      -0.03 ***   -0.03 *** 
Health problem limits activity  -0.02      -0.03 *    -0.03 **    -0.01   
Health problem affects amount of work  -0.06 ***    -0.05 **    -0.04 *    -0.05   
Health problem affects type of work  -0.07 ***    -0.06 **    -0.02      -0.02   
Ethnicity (base = white)                   
Black  -0.22 ***    -0.17 ***    -0.10 ***   -0.07 ** 
Asian (not Chinese)  -0.20 ***    -0.23 ***    -0.11 ***   -0.10 *** 
Chinese  -0.23 ***    -0.27      -0.05      -0.05   
Other  -0.10 ***    -0.12 ***    -0.05      -0.05   
Region (base = London)                   
North East  -0.31 ***    -0.25 ***    -0.32 ***   -0.28 *** 
North West  -0.26 ***    -0.21 ***    -0.26 ***   -0.22 *** 
Yorkshire and Humberside  -0.29 ***    -0.24 ***    -0.32 ***   -0.28 *** 
East Midlands  -0.25 ***    -0.18 ***    -0.28 ***   -0.26 *** 
West Midlands  -0.23 ***    -0.17 ***    -0.28 ***   -0.23 *** 
Eastern  -0.11 ***    -0.09 ***    -0.17 ***   -0.18 *** 
South East  -0.09 ***    -0.09 ***    -0.17 ***   -0.15 *** 
South West  -0.23 ***    -0.19 ***    -0.30 ***   -0.26 *** 
Wales  -0.32 ***    -0.26 ***    -0.33 ***   -0.26 *** 
Scotland  -0.27 ***    -0.22 ***    -0.31 ***   -0.26 *** 
Northern Ireland  -0.39 ***    -0.33 ***    -0.35 ***   -0.28 *** 
# children aged 0-2  0.03 ***    0.03 ***    0.02      0.03 ** 
# children aged 3-4  0.03 ***    0.02 ***    0.06 ***   0.06 *** 
# children aged 5-9  0.02 ***    0.02 ***    0.00      0.00   
# children aged 10-15  0.00      0.00      -0.07 ***   -0.06 *** 
Month of survey (base = Jan)                   
Feb  0.00      0.00      -0.02      -0.01   
Mar  0.02      0.02      -0.01      0.00   
Apr  0.03 **    0.02      0.00      0.01   
May  0.02      0.02      -0.02      -0.01   
June  0.03 **    0.02      0.02      0.03   
July  0.03 **    0.04 *    0.01      0.02   
Aug  0.03 **    0.03      0.01      0.02   
Sep  0.03 **    0.02      0.02      0.03   
Oct  0.02      0.01      0.05 **    0.06 ** 
Nov  0.05 ***    0.05 *    0.03      0.02   
Dec  0.07 ***    0.05 **    0.05 **    0.05 ** 
Year dummy 2001 = 1  0.05 ***    0.05 ***    0.06 ***   0.06 *** 
Constant  0.37  ***   0.36 ***    0.59 ***   0.56 *** 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
’25 percentile’ refers to quantile regression through the 25
th percentile. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 20 
repetitions.  78 







secondary time use 
Correcting for 
outliers 
Market work: male                 
Absolute wage  9.29 ***  8.44 ***  9.53 ***  9.06 *** 
(Absolute wage)
2  -0.34 ***  -0.31 ***  -0.35 ***  -0.33 *** 
Ln(relative wage)  -0.59   -0.25    -0.86    -0.90   
# Children age 0-2  -0.79    -1.05    -0.66    -0.94   
# Children age 3-4  1.87    1.29    2.06    2.00   
# Children age 5-9  -0.59    -0.69    -0.65    -0.77   
# Children age 10-15  -1.12    -1.22    -1.03    -0.92   
Age 18-25  5.69    4.76    5.78    6.79 ** 
Age 26-35  1.38    1.32    1.44    2.09   
Age 46-55  -2.56    -2.87    -2.42    -2.66   
Age 56+  -20.27 ***  -19.27 ***  -20.32 ***  -18.55 *** 
Constant  41.32 ***  37.26 ***  42.36 ***  40.19 *** 
                 
Market work: female                 
Absolute wage  12.83 ***  12.15 ***  13.17 ***  12.72 *** 
(Absolute wage)
2  -0.58 ***  -0.55 ***  -0.59 ***  -0.57 *** 
Ln(relative wage)  4.75 *  4.61 **  5.86 **  3.84 * 
# Children age 0-2  -18.24 ***  -16.46 ***  -19.50 ***  -16.87 *** 
# Children age 3-4  -12.59 ***  -11.15 ***  -14.23 ***  -12.62 *** 
# Children age 5-9  -6.90 ***  -6.15 ***  -7.09 ***  -6.66 *** 
# Children age 10-15  -0.20    0.13    0.10    -0.13   
Age 18-25  5.49 *  4.60    6.61 *  5.28 * 
Age 26-35  5.77 ***  5.48 ***  6.70 ***  5.41 *** 
Age 46-55  -3.12    -2.27    -2.81    -3.19   
Age 56+  -11.28 ***  -9.91 ***  -10.94 ***  -10.99 *** 
Constant  32.19 ***  28.31 ***  32.84 ***  31.88 *** 
                 
Domestic work: male                 
Absolute wage  -2.07 ***  -1.80 ***  -1.66 **  -2.04 *** 
(Absolute wage)
2  0.08 ***  0.07 ***  0.07 **  0.08 *** 
Ln(relative wage)  -1.82   -2.06 *  -2.20    -1.86   
# Children age 0-2  6.47 ***  6.37 ***  7.81 ***  6.32 *** 
# Children age 3-4  0.04    0.20    1.99    -0.05   
# Children age 5-9  1.84 ***  1.41 **  3.22 ***  1.77 *** 
# Children age 10-15  0.36    0.14    1.09    0.37   
Age 18-25  -5.38 ***  -5.25 ***  -3.90 *  -5.34 *** 
Age 26-35  -2.38 **  -2.42 **  -2.08 *  -2.38 ** 
Age 46-55  1.83    1.41    0.77    1.78   
Age 56+  6.11 ***  6.04 ***  5.30 ***  5.81 *** 
Constant  17.00 ***  14.84 ***  16.84 ***  17.04 *** 
                 
Domestic work: female                
Absolute wage  -2.59 ***  -2.58 ***  -1.72    -2.44 *** 
(Absolute wage)
2  0.11 **  0.11 **  0.07    0.10 ** 
Ln(relative wage)  -6.23 ***  -5.28 ***  -9.60 ***  -5.62 *** 
# Children age 0-2  17.48 ***  16.61 ***  24.85 ***  14.79 *** 
# Children age 3-4  10.25 ***  8.78 ***  16.68 ***  9.93 *** 
# Children age 5-9  7.21 ***  5.49 ***  10.87 ***  6.62 *** 
# Children age 10-15  2.78 ***  2.15 ***  3.35 ***  2.63 *** 
Age 18-25  -3.63 *  -3.18 *  -4.22 *  -3.67 ** 
Age 26-35  -3.68 ***  -3.61 ***  -4.60 ***  -3.44 *** 
Age 46-55  2.81 *  3.29 **  1.94    2.50 * 
Age 56+  3.59 *  4.23 **  2.40    3.34 * 
Constant  24.41 ***  21.68 ***  25.61 ***  24.58 *** 
                 
2
,m L s  
602.24 ***  527.12 ***  620.93 ***  497.04 *** 
2
, f L s  
648.05 ***  555.60 ***  710.37 ***  596.18 *** 
2
,m H s  
169.46 ***  140.61 ***  213.01 ***  163.59 *** 
2
, f H s  
228.16 ***  199.14 ***  387.17 ***  191.13 *** 
m H m L , , , s  
-177.51 ***  -142.69 ***  -190.91 ***  -155.35 *** 
f H f L , , , s  
-236.86 ***  -201.30 ***  -305.55 ***  -200.36 *** 
f L m L , , , s  
109.33 ***  96.20 ***  108.70 ***  101.13 *** 
f H m H , , , s  
5.84    10.02 **  12.31    4.09   
f H m L , , , s  
18.17    10.24    34.14 **  17.11 * 
m H f L , , , s  
4.33    -0.79    11.64    4.47   
             
Log Likelihood  -17947.74  -17635.674  -18476.728  -17731.006   79 













Split sample, 10 
percentile 
Market work: male                     
Absolute wage  9.29 ***  6.98 ***  8.77 ***  8.34 ***  12.01 *** 
(Absolute wage)
2  -0.34 ***  -0.24 ***  -0.33 ***  -0.29 ***  -0.46 *** 
Ln(relative wage)  -0.59   -4.38   5.94 **  -1.25    1.25   
# Children age 0-2  -0.79    -0.98    -0.36    -0.97    -0.76   
# Children age 3-4  1.87    1.47    2.30    1.87    2.21   
# Children age 5-9  -0.59    -0.99    -0.31    -0.66    -0.15   
# Children age 10-15  -1.12    -1.08    -1.33    -1.07    -1.04   
Age 18-25  5.69    2.18    5.53    4.72    8.18 ** 
Age 26-35  1.38    0.75    1.06    1.22    1.53   
Age 46-55  -2.56    -3.32    -2.20    -2.62    -1.11   
Age 56+  -20.27 ***  -22.46 ***  -17.98 ***  -20.10 ***  -15.29 *** 
Constant  41.32 ***  44.86 ***  42.51 ***  42.43 ***  36.85 *** 
                     
Market work: female                     
Absolute wage  12.83 ***  13.02 ***  8.44 ***  10.93 ***  14.31 *** 
(Absolute wage)
2  -0.58 ***  -0.60 ***  -0.34 ***  -0.47 ***  -0.65 *** 
Ln(relative wage)  4.75 *  6.77 **  -4.74 **  4.02    2.83   
# Children age 0-2  -18.24 ***  -19.35 ***  -19.88 ***  -20.49 ***  -13.38 *** 
# Children age 3-4  -12.59 ***  -13.70 ***  -12.89 ***  -11.36 ***  -10.75 *** 
# Children age 5-9  -6.90 ***  -7.69 ***  -8.57 ***  -7.80 ***  -4.96 *** 
# Children age 10-15  -0.20    -1.34    -3.94 ***  -1.26    0.73   
Age 18-25  5.49 *  4.43    3.08    4.74    5.78 * 
Age 26-35  5.77 ***  5.42 **  5.29 **  5.23 **  5.26 *** 
Age 46-55  -3.12    -3.54    -5.75 **  -2.46    -1.82   
Age 56+  -11.28 ***  -11.83 ***  -16.00 ***  -9.10 **  -8.43 ** 
Constant  32.19 ***  32.69 ***  31.17 ***  32.03 ***  31.32 *** 
                     
Domestic work: male                     
Absolute wage  -2.07 ***  -1.29 **  -1.64 ***  -1.50 **  -2.88 *** 
(Absolute wage)
2  0.08 ***  0.05 *  0.07 ***  0.06 **  0.12 *** 
Ln(relative wage)  -1.82   -1.74   -3.72 ***  -2.08    -1.88 * 
# Children age 0-2  6.47 ***  6.48 ***  6.28 ***  6.32 ***  6.60 *** 
# Children age 3-4  0.04    0.08    -0.02    0.19    -0.02   
# Children age 5-9  1.84 ***  1.92 ***  1.67 ***  1.84 ***  1.76 *** 
# Children age 10-15  0.36    0.38    0.25    0.36    0.29   
Age 18-25  -5.38 ***  -4.35 **  -5.14 ***  -4.83 **  -6.17 *** 
Age 26-35  -2.38 **  -2.20 **  -2.24 **  -2.30 **  -2.47 ** 
Age 46-55  1.83    2.07 *  1.67    1.98 *  1.44   
Age 56+  6.11 ***  6.82 ***  5.42 ***  6.41 ***  4.70 *** 
Constant  17.00 ***  16.16 ***  16.57 ***  16.60 ***  18.15 *** 
                     
Domestic work: female                    
Absolute wage  -2.59 ***  -2.01 **  -0.68    -1.72 *  -3.62 *** 
(Absolute wage)
2  0.11 **  0.09    0.02    0.07    0.16 *** 
Ln(relative wage)  -6.23 ***  -5.28 ***  -2.52 *  -5.24 ***  -6.11 *** 
# Children age 0-2  17.48 ***  17.87 ***  18.14 ***  18.40 ***  15.55 *** 
# Children age 3-4  10.25 ***  10.63 ***  10.47 ***  9.86 ***  9.54 *** 
# Children age 5-9  7.21 ***  7.60 ***  7.97 ***  7.60 ***  6.38 *** 
# Children age 10-15  2.78 ***  3.41 ***  4.15 ***  3.30 ***  2.28 *** 
Age 18-25  -3.63 *  -2.98    -2.37    -3.17 *  -4.00 ** 
Age 26-35  -3.68 ***  -3.54 ***  -3.51 ***  -3.47 ***  -3.53 *** 
Age 46-55  2.81 *  3.19 **  4.07 ***  2.81 *  2.36 * 
Age 56+  3.59 *  4.08 **  5.87 ***  3.26    2.73   
Constant  24.41 ***  24.73 ***  25.10 ***  24.69 ***  24.35 *** 
                     
2
,m L s  
602.24 ***  637.45 ***  587.52 ***  615.07 ***  537.14 *** 
2
, f L s  
648.05 ***  679.65 ***  730.76 ***  680.96 ***  584.67 *** 
2
,m H s  
169.46 ***  171.68 ***  168.17 ***  170.70 ***  164.92 *** 
2
, f H s  
228.16 ***  235.04 ***  239.62 ***  239.62 ***  217.15 *** 
m H m L , , , s  
-177.51 ***  -187.00 ***  -173.47 ***  -181.99 ***  -160.19 *** 
f H f L , , , s  
-236.86 ***  -252.01 ***  -269.08 ***  -251.19 ***  -211.33 *** 
f L m L , , , s  
109.33 ***  120.01 ***  114.48 ***  117.61 ***  87.28 ***   80 
f H m H , , , s  
5.84    5.17    5.32   5.70   6.77   
f H m L , , , s  
18.17    20.34 *  15.54   17.49   16.04   
m H f L , , , s  
4.33    0.31    5.49   1.16   10.35   
                




  Method used to predict gross full-time wages for: 
  Full-time workers  Part-time workers and non-
participants 
Split sample, 25 percentile 
(preferred specification) 
Conditional mean of sample of 
full-time workers 
Conditional 25
th percentile of 
sample of full-time workers 
Controls for imputed job 
tenure 
Conditional mean of sample of 
full-time workers, controls for 
work experience, work 
experience imputed from sample 
of full-time workers 
Conditional mean of sample of 
full-time workers, controls for 
work experience, work 
experience imputed from sample 
of part-time workers for part-
timers, zero for non-participants 
Heckman-corrected 
Heckman-corrected conditional 
mean of sample of full-time 
workers, number and age of 
children used for identification 
Heckman-corrected conditional 
mean of sample of full-time 
workers, number and age of 
children used for identification 
Split sample, new entrant 
wages 
Conditional mean of sample of 
full-time workers 
Conditional mean of sample of 
full-time workers in current job 
for less than 6 months 
Split sample, 10 percentile  Conditional mean of sample of 
full-time workers 
Conditional 10
th percentile of 
sample of full-time workers 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
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 Appendix Table A5. Model estimates, sample of two-earner couples with non-
missing actual net wages 
 
Wages  are  not  predicted,  but  are  (usual  take-home  pay/usual  hours  of  work)  for 
UKTUS sample. 
 
(Absolute z-statistics in brackets) 
 
  Market work (weekly hours)    Domestic work (weekly hours) 
  Males  Females    Males  Females 
                   
Absolute wage  -0.34     1.15  *    0.14     -0.41    
  (0.97)    (1.85)      (0.55)    (0.85)   
(Absolute wage)
2  0.01     -0.04  *    0.00     0.02    
  (1.15)    (1.73)      (0.25)    (1.13)   
Ln(relative wage)  0.54     1.58       -1.78     -1.34    
  (0.36)    (1.09)      (1.63)    (1.17)   
                   
# Children age 0-2  -0.79     -8.39  ***    7.14  ***  12.37  *** 
  (0.41)    (4.21)      (5.19)    (7.86)   
# Children age 3-4  1.29     -3.37    
 
1.24     6.84  *** 
  (0.63)    (1.59)      (0.85)    (4.08)   
# Children age 5-9  -0.06     -5.85  *** 
 
1.76  **  7.81  *** 
  (0.06)    (5.06)      (2.18)    (8.56)   
# Children age 10-15  0.09     -0.98    
 
0.91     3.49  *** 
  (0.10)    (0.98)      (1.33)    (4.41)   
                   
Age 18-25  -5.40     4.25       -1.55     -4.55  ** 
  (1.63)    (1.49)      (0.66)    (2.03)   
Age 26-35  0.72     2.04    
 
-3.73  ***  -1.84    
  (0.43)    (1.18)      (3.10)    (1.36)   
Age 46-55  -0.83     -4.01  *    0.41     5.25  *** 
  (0.43)    (1.87)      (0.29)    (3.12)   
Age 56+  -2.17     -5.72       1.13     5.51  * 
  (0.84)    (1.60)      (0.61)    (1.96)   
                   
Constant  50.39  ***  42.15  ***    15.57  ***  21.46  *** 
  (33.10)    (25.31)      (14.26)    (16.37)   
                   
2
,m L s ,  2
, f L s ,  2
,m H s ,  2
, f H s  
232.17  ***  248.90  *** 
 
120.07  ***  155.44  *** 
  (16.78)    (16.78)      (16.78)    (16.77)   
Implied standard errors  15.24    15.78      10.96    12.47   
m H m L , , , s , 
f H f L , , , s  
-79.92  ***  -115.92  *** 
         
  (10.24)    (12.05)             
Implied correlation coefficients  -0.48    -0.59             
f L m L , , , s , 
f H m H , , , s  
-1.01     7.55    
         
  (0.10)    (1.30)             
Implied correlation coefficients  0.00    0.06             
f H m L , , , s , 
m H f L , , , s  
18.26  **  13.96  * 
         
  (2.25)    (1.89)             
Implied correlation coefficients  0.10    0.08             
                   
Log Likelihood  -8838.1348               




Absolute wage variables are mean-centred around the mean for the sample of men   82 
and women as a whole (£7.34 p.h.). Omitted age group is 36-45. Hence the constant 
has the interpretation of the mean hours of work for a childless individual age 36-35, 
with a wage of £7.34 p.h. and a relative wage of 1 (i.e. equal wage to spouse). 
 
Marginal effects in the market work equations relate to the latent variable L* and so 
are not directly comparable with marginal effects in the domestic work equations. 
 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively   83 
Appendix B: Differing assumptions in the prediction of wages 
 
As outlined in Section 3.2, our objective is to predict the expected gross wage rate 
than an individual could receive in the labour market, were they to seek a full-time 
job. It is likely that the unobserved characteristics of non-full-time workers (which 
include past work history) will be associated with lower available potential full-time 
wages, on average, than the wages of current full-time workers.  Here we outline a 
number of different methods that can be used to tackle the problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity  between  full-time  and  non-full-time  workers.  The  sensitivity  of  our 
results to the each method is explored in Section 5.4. As the potential full-time wages 
of those who choose not to work full-time are essentially unknowable, however, it is 
difficult to discriminate between the different models on the basis of theory. 
 
Method 1: Split sample, quantile regression 
 
The preferred specification used in this paper is outlined in Section 3.2. We estimate 
separate predicting equations for full-time and non-full-time workers, where the latter 
is a quantile regression through the 25
th percentile of the full-time wage distribution. 
We  choose  the  25
th  percentile  as  a  relatively  conservative  estimate  of  the  wage 
penalty  applied  to  non-full-time  workers  –  one  test  of  robustness  is  to  lower  the 
quantile chosen to the 10
th percentile of the full-time wage distribution. Results using 
this method are labelled “Split sample, 10 percentile” in Tables 6 and 7.  
 
Method 2: Controlling for imputed work experience 
 
An alternative method of tackling the unobserved heterogeneity problem is to use the 
data in the QLFS on an individual’s months of continuous employment
26. Adding a 
control for current work history (and its quadratic) to the wage equation estimated on 
the full-time sample should help to reduce the upward bias on the other coefficients. 
When  predicting  the  wage  for  non-participants  we  plug  in  the  value  of  zero  for 
months  of  continuous  employment.  A  problem  arises  in  predicting  wages  for  the 
UKTUS sample of workers, however, as data on work histories is not provided. We 
                                                 
26 Months  with  current  employer  are  also  available  but  are  so  highly  correlated  with  months  of 
continuous employment that use of this variable adds virtually no information.   84 
use the QLFS data to impute the expected months of continuous employment for 
current labour market participants on the basis of age, education, number and age of 
children and health status, denoted collectively by the vector y. Separate regressions 
are  run  for  men  and  women  and  for  part-  and  full-time  workers,  to  allow  for 
systematic  differences  in  past  labour  market  behaviour
27.  These  imputed  work 
experience variables are then plugged in to obtain a predicted wage, i.e. 
( ) g QLFS FT gi g QLFS FT gi g QLFS FT gi gi E E x w , 2 , ,
2
, , , , ˆ ~ ˆ ~ ˆ ' ˆ ln g g b + + =  
where  g QLFS FT , , ˆ g  and  2 , , , ˆ g QLFS FT g  are  the  coefficients  of  months  of  continuous 
employment  from  the  QLFS  full-time  workers  equation  and  gi E
~
 is  imputed  work 
experience, calculated according to: 
g QLFS FT gi gi y E , , ˆ '
~
a =  for full-time workers 
g QLFS PT gi gi y E , , ˆ '
~
a =  for part-time workers 
0
~
= gi E  for non-participants 
 
The a ˆ ’s are estimated by regressing months of continuous work experience on the set 
of  gi y  variables, using the relevant sample of QLFS workers. 
 
This method has the advantage that it controls, albeit in a crude way, for the fact that 
individuals differ in predictable ways in their  experience-related human capital.  It 
does not, however, deal with the problem of heterogeneity that is unobserved over and 
above heterogeneity in months of continuous employment. It seems likely, therefore, 
that this method will continue to over-estimate the full-time wage available to part-
time workers and non-participants. 
 
Method 3: Heckman correction for sample selectivity 
 
The Heckman estimator uses a parametric assumption to deal with the effects on non-
random  selection  into  full-time  employment.  Its  drawback  is  that  it  requires  an 
exclusion restriction in order for the selection term to be identified. As is common in 
                                                 
27 Sample sizes for the equations used to impute work experience are: 115 147 full-time men, 5775 
part-time men, 52 650 full-time women and 47 854 part-time women (all in couples). Sample sizes are 
larger than for the wage equations due to the presence of missing data on wages.   85 
the  literature,  we  use  number  and  age  of  children  in  the  first-stage  prediction  of 
whether or not an individual works full-time. A number of authors have expressed 
dissatisfaction  with  the  assumptions  required  by  the  Heckman  procedure  (e.g. 
Pencavel, 1998, pp. 784) and it seems likely that this exclusion restriction will not be 
valid, for women in particular
28.  
 
The prediction method uses the information provided by the Heckman selection term. 
The expected full-time wage for an individual drawn randomly from the population is 
given by  b ˆ ' ] | [ln i i i x x w E = , i.e. the inverse Mills’ ratio ( i l ) is not used in prediction, 
but is included only to correct for selection bias. Given that we know an individual’s 
employment status, however, we can use this information to improve our estimate of 
the individual’s predicted wage. Specifically, the Heckman formula implies that 
gi g QLFS g QLFS gi gi gi gi x FT x w E l d b ˆ ˆ ˆ ' ] 1 , | [ln , , + = =  
and 
gi g QLFS g QLFS gi gi gi gi x FT x w E l d b ˆ ˆ ˆ ' ] 0 , | [ln , , - = =  
where  g QLFS, ˆ d  is the coefficient on the selection term and  gi l ˆ  is the inverse Mills’ 
ratio calculated by applying the coefficients from the 1
st stage QLFS probit equation 
to  the  characteristics  of  individual i  from  the UKTUS  sample.  Intuitively, we are 
using the model assumption that the expected value of the error term is higher for 
individuals with ‘positive’ unobservables who select into full-time work and lower for 
individuals with ‘negative’ observables who do not. In fact, the estimate of  g QLFS, ˆ d  
turns out to be negative in the sample of women, implying that women who self-select 
into full-time employment command lower wages, on average, than women with the 
same  observable  characteristics  who  work  part-time  or  not  at  all.  This  finding 
contradicts  what  we  would  expect  on  the  basis  of  theory  and  may  reflect 
misspecification of the underlying parametric assumptions and/or an invalid exclusion 
restriction.  The  selection  term  is  of  the  expected  positive  sign  for  men  however. 
Wages  predicted  using  the  Heckman  procedure,  therefore,  tend  to  predict  larger 
gender  wage  differences  amongst  full-time  workers  than  other  techniques  and 
narrower  gender  differences  amongst  part-time  workers  and  non-participants.  We 
                                                 
28 The Heckman estimator uses 85 785 observations on non-full-time working women in addition to the 
15  652  full-timers.  For  men,  we  have  27  237  censored  observations  in  addition  to  the  29  158 
uncensored observations.   86 
present results using the Heckman technique in Tables 6 and 7 for comparison with 
other estimates, but urge caution for the reasons outlined above. 
 
Method 4: Split sample, new entrants’ wages 
 
An alternative method to predict wages for part-time workers and non-participants is 
to utilise data on the wages of full-time workers who have only recently started new 
jobs. Devereux (2004) uses the wages of individuals who worked for only between 
one and 13 weeks in the last year to impute wages for non-participants. In a similar 
spirit, we run a QLFS wage equation on full-time workers who have been in their 
current position for less than six months. (In order to maximise the sample size of this 
group, we relax the restriction here that our sample consist of individuals in couples, 
but include a dummy for marital status. Sample sizes are 2438 women and 3591 men.) 
Predicted wages of part-timers and non-participants are then calculated using these 
coefficients, whilst the predicted wages of full-time workers are imputed using the 
same procedure as in Method 1. Again, this procedure is somewhat unsatisfactory as 
the sample of full-time workers with short job tenure is likely to differ in terms of 
unobserved human capital from those who have chosen not to work full-time. The 
method does, however, adjust for the fact that the potential wages of non-full-time 
workers will reflect their lack of firm-specific human capital.    87 
Appendix C: Simulation of the likelihood for censored cases 
 






i y y y =  as outlined in 
Section 4.2. We can partition the mean vector, error vector and covariance matrix in 
the same way, i.e.  




i i q q q X X X =  




















) ( ) (























ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε
 
The joint density of 
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i y  can be written as the product of the marginal density of 
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y , and the conditional density of 
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definitions of normal marginal and conditional distributions, these densities are 
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The likelihood contribution for censored cases is given by  
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y  has a closed form solution, but the presence of the double integral 
in the expression for the likelihood contribution of no-earner households means that 
this will not always hold for the second term.  
 
We use a recursive conditioning procedure known as the GHK simulator to evaluate 
the probability each household contributes to the likelihood
29. The first step of the 
                                                 
29 Prowse (2004) employs a GHK estimator in the estimation of individual time allocation decisions to 
a number of different activities. The model estimated by Prowse treats the unit of observation as the 
individual, rather than the household, and so does not explore the inter-dependencies of spouses’ labour 
supplies.   88 
procedure transforms the vector 
* C
i y  into a multivariate standard normal vector,  i z , 
where 
( ) ) I , ( ~ .
* 1 0 y L z N U C
C
i i m - =
-  
The matrix L is derived from the Cholesky decomposition of  U CC. S , such that 
' . LL = S U CC .  
The integral in (C1) can then be written 
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where  ) ( | i f z Z  is a standard multivariate normal distribution. 
 








































U C i i
m m
m  
where  R r ,..., 1 =  indexes  the  replication; 
1
.U C m  and 
2
.U C m  are  the  first  and  second 
elements of  U C. m  respectively;  ij L  is the (i,j)th element  of L ;  r z , 2  is the rth draw 











 and  () × F  is the 
standard normal c.d.f. For properties of the GHK estimator, see Börsh-Saupan and 
Hajivassiliou (1993). 
 